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This study examines the rise of China through the eyes of the smaller powers 
in Southeast Asia. The central argument of this paper is that the perception of 
the rise of China is a constructed narrative. By ‘constructed narrative’ I mean 
that state’s perception of China’s rise is a domestically-oriented, and 
contextually-specific story. The “rise of China is a peaceful one”, or “China’s 
rise is threatening to regional stability”—these are narratives that have been 
constructed and utilized by individual Southeast Asian states to fulfil certain 
political agenda. Existing studies largely fail to explain why there is a wide 
divergence of response to the rise of China in Southeast Asia. I point out that 
while China’s economic ascendance is an empirical fact and has been well 
acknowledged by its Southeast Asian neighbors, however, it does not 
necessarily mean that each state would perceive China’s rise in the same way. 
On the contrary, just as “there are a thousand hamlets in a thousand people's 
eyes”, each state has come up with its own narratives for ‘China’s Rise’ that 
speaks to its own national interests. Seeing the rise of China through the eyes 
of each individual state is different, not homogenous; and therefore the ‘rise of 
China’ constitutes a specific set of meanings to each state in Southeast Asia. 
As such, the ‘constructed narrative’ framework offers a better approach to 
understanding perceptions of the rise of China. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
Over the past ten years, the ‘Rise of China’ has become one of the most 
prominently debated topics in both the academic and public sphere. China’s 
rise to regional hegemony as an empirical phenomenon has been examined 
from different perspectives and approaches in International Relations (IR). A 
large bulk of the existing literature focuses exclusively on great power 
competition, conflict, or cooperation; and theorizes the rise of China through 
the lens of great power politics, in particular the act of the United States of 
America (US) rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific. No rigorous research has been 
done on smaller regional powers’ responses to the changing political dynamics 
in the region engendered by China’s economic ascendance.       
Integrating smaller powers into the IR literature is challenging as IR is 
predominantly a ‘great power’ discipline that “attracts scholars who are from 
great powers and interested in great power politics.”  However, understanding 1
the role of smaller powers in shaping the development of regional politics 
would contribute to the core of IR literature on foreign policy because smaller 
powers are an integral part of the international system. Smaller powers are 
important because they play a crucial role in shaping the process of hegemonic 
power transition.  In this study I turn the perspective around by looking at how 2
non-hegemonic powers in Southeast Asia perceive and respond to China’s 
ascendance. 
 Kassimeris, C. (2009). The foreign policy of small powers. International Politics, 46(1), 861
 Randall Schweller and Pu Xiaoyu have argued that status recognition is necessary for a rising 2
power to be regarded as hegemony by the small and medium sized powers. 
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Existing scholarship generally assumes that the rise of China has exerted 
homogenous effects on countries across the region. Yet there is a wide 
divergence of responses to China’s rise in Southeast Asia. Many scholars 
emphasized the states’ external environment, and presumably that a country’s 
foreign policy is less constrained by domestic factors as opposed to the 
external threat.  States’ responses to China’s rise have been broadly 3
categorized into ‘balancing’, ‘bandwagoning’, and ‘hedging’, all of which are 
deduced from the balance of power (BOP) logic.  
Since 2010,  China has been commonly represented as an assertive power 
projecting its hegemonic influence in Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, regional 
responses to China’s rise have demonstrated a high degree of volatility and 
inconsistency.  In spite of being a claimant state competing for disputed waters 4
with China in the South China Sea, Malaysia opted for a quieter and non-
hostile approach to deal with the issue. Vietnam and the Philippines, on the 
other hand, clearly adopted a more proactive strategy which has caused the 
 Elman, M. F. (1995). The foreign policies of small states: Challenging neorealism in its own 3
backyard. British Journal of Political Science, 25(2), 175.
 First, perceptions and responses to a rising China differed drastically across countries. One 4
the one hand, official discourses in Cambodia and Myanmar generally regarded China as a 
peaceful rising power, and its economic ascendance would have brought overall benefits to this 
region. On the other hand, countries like Vietnam and the Philippines have questioned the 
intention of China in the South China Sea, and they have the incentive to believe that China’s 
rise would be threatening should the balance of power is absent. Second, inconsistency and 
volatility is also evident within a country, reflected in the foreign policy shifts. For example, 
David Shambaugh noted that most states in the Southeast Asian region now identify China as 
a good neighbor, a constructive partner, a careful listener, and a nonthreatening regional 
power. While this perspective is striking because not very long time ago most states were 
concerned about the possibility of China becoming a threat to regional stability. Shambaugh, D. 
(2004;2005;). China engages asia: Reshaping the regional order. International Security, 29(3), 
64-99. Evelyn Goh pointed out regional evaluations of the implications of China’s rise remain 
mixted. Evelyn Goh, “Southeast Asian responses to China’s rise, Managing the “elephants”?” in 
Cooney, K. J., Sato, Y., & NetLibrary, I. (2009). The rise of china and international security: 
America and asia respond. New York, NY: Routledge.
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escalation of tensions.  Current studies offer no insightful explanations for 5
variations of this sort. Clearly, the ‘exogenous shocks explanation’  for 6
regional responses to China’s rise is insufficient to tell the full story. I argue 
that domestic politics has played an equally, if not more important role in 
shaping the perception of China’s rise.  
This study aims to explain the divergence of response to the rise of China. 
To complement the existing explanations, I argue that domestic political 
changes will alter the state’s perception and response towards China. 
Therefore the theorization of the rise of China should take into account 
domestic variables by identifying various sources that have affected 
perceptions. The central argument of this paper is that the perception of 
the rise of China is a constructed narrative. By ‘constructed narrative’ I 
mean that perception of the rise of China is not to be understood as a reaction 
to China’s rise of material capability and international status.  Perception of 7
China’s rise is a domestically-oriented, constructed narrative. It is both 
contextually-specific and historically-contingent. For example, the “rise of 
China is a peaceful one”, or “China’s rise is threatening to regional 
 Newspaper articles reveal that the Malaysian government opted for a peaceful and quiet 5
approach to resolve South China Sea dispute, see, Amin Mokhtar, “Malaysia believes South 
China Sea dispute can be resolved peacefully.” 13 July 2016, New Straits Times <http://
www.nst.com.my/news/2016/07/157950/malaysia-believes-south-china-sea-dispute-can-be-
resolved-peacefully> ; Ralph Jennings, “Why Malaysia stays quiet about its claims in the South 
China Sea.” 2 June 2016, Forbes <http://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2016/06/02/why-
malaysia-stays-quiet-about-its-claims-in-the-disputed-south-china-sea/#b2737a61beb9>.
 This explanation basically argues that the increased Chinese assertiveness has caused an 6
escalation of tension in the region. China is largely, if not solely responsible for it. 
 Current studies hold that China’s growing economic and military influence is arguably the 7
most important factor shaping the regional security environment in the light of the US 
rebalancing to Southeast Asia. Please refer to Ely Ratner “China and the Evolving Security 
Dynamics in East Asia: Security Dynamics in Southeast Asia and Oceania and Implications for 
the United States”. March 13, 2014. Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission. http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Ratner_Testimony.pdf 
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stability”—these are narratives that have been constructed and utilized by 
individual Southeast Asian states to maximize national interest.  
Existing literature often equates remarkable economic growth with China’s 
rise. This approach treats China’s rise as an abstract yet vague concept. 
Certainly, China’s economic ascendance is an empirical fact and has been well 
acknowledged by its Southeast Asian neighbors. However, it does not 
necessarily mean that each state would perceive an economically rising China 
in the same way. On the contrary, just as ‘[There] are a thousand Hamlets in a 
thousand people's eyes’, each state has come up with its own narratives of 
‘China’s Rise’ that speaks to its own national interests. Seeing the rise of 
China through the eyes of each individual state is different, not homogenous; 
and therefore the ‘rise of China’ constitutes a specific set of meanings to each 
state. It is important to analyze the rise of China by moving down from the 
level of abstraction with a more empirically-grounded approach. I am going to 
demonstrate that the ‘constructed narrative’ framework offers a better way to 
understand perceptions of the rise of China and foreign policy shifts. 
I select three Southeast Asian countries for empirical testing: Vietnam, the 
Philippines, and Malaysia. I hypothesize that political legitimacy crises are 
critical disjunctures that allow us to observe variations and to explain different 
narratives about China’ rise. I argue that countries experiencing legitimacy 
crises are more likely to witnessing an inconsistent narrative being constructed 
by the state authority. This is because in times of legitimacy crises on the 
national-level, the state is more likely to change the foreign policy orientation. 
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The effects of political legitimacy on a country’s perception and foreign policy 
shifts are observed in Vietnam and the Philippines. In addition, to control for 
the exogenous effects brought by the perceived Chinese assertiveness in the 
South China Sea, I use Malaysia as a contrasting case. This allows me to better 
observing and identifying the conditions whereby narratives are constructed, 
while explaining the reasons behind each approach the state has adopted to 
cope with China’s rise in the region.  
I examine major leadership transitions and legitimacy crises that have 
occurred in Vietnam and the Philippines after independence. In Vietnam, 
political legitimacy crises that occurred both before and after the unification 
had a great impact on the country’s foreign policy orientation. Vietnam is 
classified as an authoritarian regime ruled by one single party—the 
Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP); the party has had experienced several 
legitimacy crises. The most recent one which was caused by the global 
economic crisis in 2008 has triggered the rise of anti-China nationalism in 
Vietnam.  Nationalism has exerted an important impact on Vietnam’s foreign 8
policy towards China. Post-2008 Vietnam attempted to maintain a good 
relations with China at the party-to-party basis, but also became intolerable for 
the increased Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. Overall, Vietnam-
Sino bilateral relations have worsened since 2010.   
The Philippines is a practicing democracy that has experienced rather 
frequent leadership changes. Legitimacy issues have concerned Philippine 
 HIEP, L. H. (2012). Performance-based legitimacy: The case of the communist party of 8
vietnam and "doi moi". Contemporary Southeast Asia, 34(2), 145-172. 
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politicians constantly right before each general election.  Legitimacy crises in 9
this country were often accompanied by leadership transitions.  The lose of 10
legitimacy of the ruling government would trigger legitimacy crises. One 
tactic that Benigno Aquino’s (also known as Aquino III) government practiced 
to justify his rise to power is attacking the sources of political legitimacy that 
had once supported his predecessor Gloria Arroyo and her cabinet. 
Consequentially, Philippines’ foreign policy towards China had been 
reoriented into a different direction after Aquino came to power because 
Chinese investment was deemed important to Arroyo’s government. A rising 
China after 2010 is identified less as an economic powerhouse, the image of a 
trouble-maker threatening to regional stability has instead become more 
prominent. In addition to that, a new narrative of China that both explains and 
justifies the foreign policy approach took up by Aquino’s government has been 
materialized.  
The contribution of this study is two-fold. One, my findings supplement the 
classic IR theories on hegemonic power transition by filling up the gaps in the 
literature. I point out that the power transition literature emphasizes almost 
exclusively the consequences of power transition, and little has been said 
about the process of each transition. Locating my research in this scholarship, 
my approach aims to better examine some of the important factors that will 
shape the process of power shift occurring in Asia today.  
 See, for example, Croissant, A., & Martín, B. (2006). Between consolidation and crisis: 9
Elections and democracy in five nations in southeast asia. London;Münster;: Lit. 32-33
 John T. Sidel, “The Philippines The Languages of Legitimation” in Alagappa, M., Case, W. F., 10
& Khong, C. O. (1995). Political legitimacy in southeast asia: The quest for moral authority. 
Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.
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Two, this study offers a more empirically tuned explanation for regional 
responses to China’s rise. Instead of applying the abstract IR concepts to 
explain interstates relations and diplomatic behaviors, I am focusing on a 
country’s domestic domain with the aim of drawing the connection between 
domestic politics and foreign policy making. My work looks into detail of 
political changes at home in relation to its China’s policy. Since I examine and 
assess the foreign policy towards China across a few Southeast Asian 
countries, this work is also policy-relevant. My findings will shed light on 
government’s decision making; government officials in both China and 
Southeast Asia countries will be able to better assess the pros and cons of their 
foreign policy.  
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Chapter 2  Explaining the Rise of China: IR Theories and Policy Studies 
  
In this chapter, I first discuss studies on the rise of China and power shifts. The 
study on the rise and fall of states and international order is an enduring grand 
question that the scholarship of International Relations (IR) has attempted to 
explain. IR scholars are genuinely interested to find out the causes and 
consequences of power shifts. The rise of China has been examined from 
mainly three broad approaches—the grand IR theories aim to forecasting the 
possible trajectories of China’s rise and its implications for the transformation 
of international system; the mid-range theories that look into specific tactics 
which other states have adopted to cope with the rise of China; and the policy-
oriented works that focus on the debates of current affairs such as the South 
China Sea territorial disputes.  
I highlight three gaps in the existing literature, more specifically, the 
theoretical limitations of each established theory on the explanation of China’s 
rise. One common problem in the existing literature is failure to acknowledge 
and to explain the inconsistency of response to the rise of China across 
Southeast Asia. There is a mismatch between the theoretical claims and the 
empirical facts.  
The second gap is closely related to the first one, that many approaches 
existing studies have adopted to conceptualize the rise of China are 
problematic. I critique some of the conventional approaches which take 
China’s rise as a static concept. More specifically, China’s rise is being 
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understood as a self-evident phenomenon of economic or military expansion.  11
This conceptualization shed no light on the understanding of how states would 
have responded to a rising hegemony because it said little about the perception 
of the rise of China which is heterogeneous in nature and subject to changes.  
Lastly, current works make predications for the rise of China based on the 
model of great power competition, in which smaller regional powers are 
excluded from the game. Even though some mid-range theories have been 
applied to explain behaviors that are beyond the explanatory power of the 
logic of balancing and bandwagoning. In general there lacks a good 
assessment on smaller regional powers in shaping the process of today’s 
power shift. This section ends with my new approach—I explain how and why 
it helps to offer a more empirically-informed understanding of the power shift 
in Asia today.  
2.1  Situating the Rise of China in IR Theories   
2.1.1  Realism, Power Transition Theory  
China’s rise to regional hegemony has captured the attention of IR theorists 
over the past decades. The established grand theories in IR—specifically 
Realism and power transition theory, have given account to the possible 
outcomes to international system with the effects of China’s economic 
ascendance. The rise of China has now been closely associated with power 
 Most works I have read so far take the rise of China as given, and a self-evident empirical 11
phenomenon because of its remarkable economic growth and military modernization observed 
over the past ten to fifteen years. 
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transition theory. As noted by Jack Levy, “many scholars writing on the rise of 
China and its consequences for world politics in the twenty-first century 
attempt to ground their analyses in power transition theory.”  Undeniably, 12
power transition theory offers a powerful conceptual tool for IR scholars to 
examine rising powers and the consequences of power shifts. In particular, one 
essential question this scholarship asks is: “How do power shifts reshape and 
transform international hierarchies and world order?” As observed by 
Wohlforth, Kirshner and Mastanduno, power transitions represent an enduring 
theme in International Politics because power transitions create opportunities 
for the, which often violent, transformation of international order.   13
The theoretical importance of hegemonic transition, as highlighted by many 
scholars, explains the prominence of power transition theory throughout the 
long tradition of IR theory. For example, A.F.K. Organski developed a 
systematic theory of power transition to correct the deficiencies he identified 
in balance of power theory.  Robert Gilpin in his 1981 classic War and 14
Change in World Politics argues that international order is created and directed 
by powerful states when rising up through hegemonic transition.  Gilpin’s 15
work has a profound impact on the IR theorization of international order. 
Scholars have subsequently developed theorizes of rising and declining 
powers based on the premise of Gilpin’s larger theoretical framework; the 
 Jack S. Levy, Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China, in China’s Ascent edited by 12
Robert Ross and Zhu Feng, pp.11.
 See works by William C. Wohlforth, Jonathan Kirshner, and Michael Mastanduno in Power, 13
Order, and Change in World Politics.
 Organski, A. F. K. (1968). World politics (2d [rev.] ed.). New York: Knopf.14
 Gilpin, R. (1981). War and change in world politics. Cambridge; New York;: Cambridge 15
University Press, pp.3.
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recent scholarly debates have been developed around China’s rise in the Asia-
Pacific.  
If we were to study transitions, we must know where they are coming from 
in the first place. The biggest problem I saw in power transition theory is the 
lack of explicit and systematic theorization for the causes of power transitions. 
In other words, there is no explicit explanation for important questions such 
as: when and under what conditions do power transitions occur? For instance, 
one prominent view suggests that as China gets more powerful and the US 
hegemonic position declines, a series of strategic competition between China 
and the US-led liberal order will be inevitable.   16
An opposing view hold by many liberal scholars such as John Ikenberry, 
claim that while the international order of unipolarity since the end of the Cold 
War will end, it does not necessarily mean that the US-China competition will 
be a zero-sum game but one that is more accommodating since China has been 
highly integrated into the liberal world order.   17
While both beliefs offer a useful way of thinking the possible outcomes of 
power shifts, they clearly excluded factors which matter and therefore will 
shape the process of power transitions. Failure to address these questions 
means there is no appropriate explanation for the process of each power 
transition, and thus, we would not know which factors would be considered 
 See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: 16
W.W. Norton, 2001); Aaron Friedberg, “The Future of US-China Relations: Is Conflict 
Inevitable?,” International Security, Vol.30, No.2 (Fall 2005).
 John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can Liberal System 17
Survive?,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 1 (January/February 2008)
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important in shaping the development along the process. As a result, current 
studies generally take power transition as a condition, and a starting point 
which is used to predict the implications of China’s rise to hegemonic status. 
However, the predicated outcomes would illuminate little light in illustrating 
other possible trajectories of China’s hegemonic power transition. This is 
because many approaches in this body of literature presuppose non-hegemonic 
actors’ acceptance to the notion of China’s rise, while dismisses the fact that 
along the process these actors are also actively transfiguring hegemonic 
transition, and are part of the development. Incorporating the perspective of 
non-hegemonic actors’ responses to the changing political dynamics 
engendered by China’s rise provides an insightful way of dissecting the 
process of power shift.  
2.1.2  The Logic of Balancing and Bandwagoning  
    
Apart from power transition theory, a huge bulk of the existing literature on 
hegemonic transition has been developed around the dichotomy of balancing 
and bandwagoning. Among all the hypotheses deduced from the grand IR 
theories to conceptualize the implications of a power shift on regional order, 
the logic of balancing and bandwagoning emerged to become the most 
commonly applied analytical tool. The balance of power or threat arguments, 
which also provide theoretical support for the ‘China Threat’ literature, 
contend that China’s rise will inevitably lead at least a “minimum to rivalry 
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and tension, and at a maximum to a major confrontation.”  As a result, non-18
hegemonic states are more likely to balance against the rising hegemon and 
keep the existing hegemonic power as a counter-weight.  This position is 19
grounded in the long tradition of realism, as many prominent realist scholars 
have argued, that states rarely allying with, [they] rather against a powerful 
state because bandwagoning means “disproportionate share of the spoils”  20
which turns against “states maximize relative power”    21
Theorists arguing for the logic of balancing content that in times of power 
transitions, states are more likely to balancing against, and less likely to 
bandwagoning with a potential hegemon, this is especially true when the rising 
hegemon is perceived as having revisionist intentions.  Kenneth Waltz draws 22
an explicit link between high levels of uncertainty and possible balancing 
behaviors. When the levels of uncertainty increase, according to Waltz, that 
bandwagoning is less likely to happen as “uncertainty constrains the individual 
 Yan Xuetong, The Rise of China and its Power Status, Chinese Journal of International 18
Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2006, 7.
 See, for example, Denny Roy, ‘Hegemon on the Horizon? China’s Threat to East Asian 19
Security’, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1994, pp. 149–68; Robert Ross, ‘Balance of 
Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia’, Security 
Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2006, pp. 355–95; Adam Ward, ‘China and America: Trouble Ahead?’, 
Survival, Vol. 45, No. 3, 2003, pp. 35–56; Peter Hays Gries, ‘China Eyes the Hegemon’, Orbis, 
Vol. 49, No. 3, 2005, pp. 401–12; Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Posing Problems Without Catching 
Up: China’s Rise and the Challenges for US Security Policy’, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 
4, 2001, pp. 5–40; Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise 
of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia’, International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2006, pp. 81–
126.Christensen, Thomas J. “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and 
U.S. Policy toward East Asia.” International Security, 1 (2006): 81–126; Kuick, Cheng-Chwee. 
“The China Factor in the US’ ‘Re-Engagement’ with Southeast Asia: Drivers and Limits of 
Converged Hedging.” Asian Politics & Policy, 3 (2012): 315–344. Michael Mastanduno and 
William C. Wohlforth. “Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences.” 
World Politics, 1 (2009): 1–27; Zhou Fangyin, “China’s Rise, the Transformation of East Asian 
Regional Structure, and Development Direction of the East Asian Order”, in The world in 2020 
according to china : Chinese foreign policy elites discuss emerging trends in international 
politics edited by Shao Binghong 2014, pp.172.
 Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. New York: Norton, pp.163.20
 Ibid21
 Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, Hans Morgenthau, William R. Thompson, and John 22
Mearsheimer have argued for the prevalence of the balance of power theory because in an 
anarchic international order, states seek to expand their power to survive. 
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states’ ability to cooperate with one another.”  Contrasting with Waltz’s 23
structuralist explanation, some realist scholars hold the belief that balancing is 
necessary to counter not only the external, but also the internal threats. Steven 
David, for example, attributes domestic politics as a contributing cause for 
balancing behaviors. David argues that state leaders facing the need to balance 
against both internal and external threats to ensure regime survival and to 
appease secondary adversaries.  John Mearsherimer argues that the rise of 24
China, in spite of any other factor, will threaten America hegemony and 
therefore, lead to great power conflict with the US. For Mearsheimer, states do 
not just seek security but power maximization by becoming regional 
hegemons and to establish their own spheres of dominance. China, therefore, 
would not be satisfied with just becoming more powerful under the current 
international system, but instead would seek to minimize the US presence in 
Asia by building a new system under its own sphere of influence. 
Mearsherimer’s overly deterministic argument is unable to explain when non-
aggressive actions are preferred by the states while experiencing regional 
power shifts.     
While the BOP logic provides a useful way of conceptualizing the rise and 
fall of great powers, this logic, however, does not by itself appropriately 
explain why balancing is being or will be applied to China. Stephen Walt’s 
balance of threat theory argues that it is the perceptions of whether a rising 
 Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of international politics. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. 23
Co, pp.79-80.
 David, S. R. (1991). Choosing sides: Alignment and realignment in the third world. Baltimore: 24
Johns Hopkins University Press, pp.236.
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China is threatening rather than the distribution of power itself that would 
determine the act of balancing. According to Walt, Southeast Asian states 
would balance China due to its ‘assertive actions’ in the South China Sea. 
Therefore, other regional players are motivated to ensure the US maintains 
their, specifically military presence in the region.  
The BOP theory also largely fails to predict regional response to China’s 
rise in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia. After the end of the Cold War, Southeast 
Asia identifies a rising China as having benign intentions,  and therefore 25
Southeast Asia lacks of balancing behavior. This is because the grand IR 
theories largely operate at the level of abstraction, and lack explanatory power 
to adequately explain empirical phenomena. More empirical oriented studies 
conducted by some mid-range theorists provide a viable supplement to this 
field. In particular, they have examined Southeast Asia’s response to China’s 
rise by looking at the specific areas of cooperation. And it is believed by many, 
that Southeast Asia as a whole copes with China’s economic rise and military 
modernization by working closely with China for greater economic benefits 
but maintain strategically ambivalent with suspicion.  Based on empirical 26
evidence, Southeast Asian states generally identify positively with China’s 
economic rise, and that they do not hesitate in seeking economic cooperation 
 See Shi Chunlai, “China-Australia Relations: A Chinese View,” (http://www.aiia.asn.au/news/ 25
chunlai.html.) 
 See, Amitav Acharya’s Containment, engagement, or counter-dominance? Malaysia’s 26
response to the rise of China; Michael Leifer’s Indonesia’s encounters with China and the 
dilemmas of engagement; Yuen Foong Khong’s Singapore: a time for economic and political 
engagement in Engaging China edited by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (1999).; 
Evelyn Goh’s Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional 
Security Strategies 
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with China, which can be explained by Randall Schweller’s ‘bandwagoning 
for profit’ argument.  27
Regional experts have also supported the ‘bandwagoning for profit’ 
explanation. For example, Evelyn Goh examines the lack of balancing 
behavior in Southeast Asia in response to China’s rise, she argues that the 
pressure to maintain a balance between the US and China offers states a 
continuum of policy options rather than a stark choice between balancing and 
bandwagoning.  These states have adopted a mixed strategy to engage with 28
China.  Goh’s observation is well supported by the empirics. For instance, 29
China has become a dialogue partner and later a full member of the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF), a regional political and security multilateral platform 
in 2002. On the whole regional sates do not seem to be entirely, but selectively 
bandwagoning with China. Like Goh, David Kang also highlights on the lack 
of balancing behavior in Southeast Asia which he provides an cultural and 
historical explanation to it.  30
Following the balancing and bandwagoning discussion is the debate on 
whether China being a status quo or revisionist power, and has become one of 
the most popular topics in seminars, academic conferences, and for media 
reports.  Similar to the balancing and bandwagoning debate, the status quo 31
 Schweller, R. L. (1994). Bandwagoning for profit: Bringing the revisionist state back in. 27
International Security, 19(1), 72-107.
 Goh, E., & East-West Center Washington. (2005). Meeting the china challenge: The U.S. in 28
southeast asian regional security strategies. Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington.
 Ibid29
 Kang, D. C. (2003). Getting asia wrong: The need for new analytical frameworks. 30
International Security, 27(4), pp.58.
 See, for example Qin Yaqing, National Identity, Strategic Culture and Security Interests, 31
China’s Security Strategy, and Feng Huiyun, Is China a Revisionist Power? Chinese Journal of 
International Politics
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versus revisionist power debate sets another dichotomy, but with more 
emphasis on intention. At the core of the status quo versus revisionist debate 
has been whether or not China has incentives to change the system.   32
A common characterization of China is that it is a dissatisfied, revisionist 
state, expressed in everything with the ultimate aim of replacing the US 
unipolarity with a multipolar distribution of power.  The counter-argument 33
claims that China does not have intention to overthrow or violently alter the 
existing world order and international system. Ikenberry believes that “while 
non-Western rising powers such as China seek greater voice and authority in 
the global system, surprisingly perhaps, they still embrace the basic principles 
and institutions of an liberal world order”  Buzan’s observation for China’s 34
rise is that it is a peaceful one, similar to Ikenberry’s argument. Buzan 
understands peaceful rise to mean that a growing power is able to make both 
absolute and relative gains in both its material and its status positions, in 
relation to the other powers in the international system, and to do so without 
precipitating major hostilities between itself and either its neighbors or other 
major powers.   35
 The debate on whether China is a status quo power or revisionist power. See, for example, 32
David Lake’s Dominance and Subordination in World Politics: authority, liberalism, and stability 
in the modern international order; John Ikenberry’s The logic of order: Westphalia, liberalism, 
and the evolution of international order in the modern era; Michael Mastanduno’s Order and 
change in world politics: the financial crisis and the breakdown of the US-China grand bargain; 
Qin Yaqing, National Identity, Strategic Culture and Security Interests, China’s Security 
Strategy, Feng Huiyun, Is China a Revisionist Power? Chinese Journal of International Politics
 Observed by Iain Johnston in “Is China a Status Quo Power?” , International Security, vol. 33
27, no. 4, pp. 5-56.
 Ikenberry, G.J. 2008, The Rise of China and the Future of the West.34
 Buzan, B. (2010). China in international society: Is 'peaceful rise' possible? The Chinese 35
Journal of International Politics, 3(1), pp.5.
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However, both dichotomies do not provide convincing answers for the 
phenomenon of inconsistent perceptions and responses. The analytical 
framework of this binary, regional actors are expected to behave 
homogeneously in the context of China’s rise. Empirical evidence has proven 
otherwise. To explain the variations which are not well captured by the 
dichotomy requires one to pay more attention to regional powers, and treat 
each as unique actor and not a homogenous entity.   
  
2.2  Situating the Smaller Powers in IR 
The general assumption which the mainstream IR literature holds is that 
powers rise and fall are predominantly the game of great powers, and small 
powers play an insignificant role in the process of power transitions. The study 
on the rise of China has largely focused on the rivalry between great-powers. 
According to David Shambaugh, major power rivalry refers to the inevitable 
clash between the existing dominant power (the US) and the rising power 
(China), owing to the asymmetric structural properties of the regional system. 
He further claims that “historically, rising powers inevitably challenge 
dominant powers, and that this zero-sum competition for dominance is a 
virtual law of international relations, at least for the realist school.”  The 36
period of “power transition” is particularly unstable and conflict-prone.  37
Therefore, to individual Southeast Asian states, the greatest threat to their 
strategic interests lies in the potential for great-power rivalry to undermine 
 Shambaugh, D. L., & NetLibrary, I. (2006). Power shift: China and asia's new dynamics. 36
Berkeley: University of California Press, pp.13.
 Ronald L. Tammen et al., Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century37
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regional autonomy.  Yahuda and Pollack both argue that a full-fledged 38
regional order has yet to emerge.  Under this circumstance, the fear of the 39
US-China rivalry which will threaten regional stability, has become a major 
concern for Southeast Asian states.  
Few scholars have examined the role of the smaller states in Southeast Asia 
in shaping the process of power transition, with the exception of David Kang, 
Amitav Acharya, Robert Ross, Evelyn Goh and Denny Roy and Ja Ian Chong. 
Chong believe that non-hegemonic states in Southeast Asia often adopt a 
mixed approach that goes beyond the balancing versus bandwagoning 
dichotomy such as hedging,  or buffering, bonding, binding and 40
beleaguering.  Instead of focusing on the debates at the level of abstraction, 41
the above mentioned scholars opted for the mid-range level theories to analyze 
regional players’ response to great power competition.  
Their approaches help to escape the dichotomous conceptualisation of the 
change in the international system which is ill suited for the understanding of 
China’ rise in the context of power shift. Evelyn Goh sees Southeast Asia as 
facing a parallel US-China “resurgence” in the region, requiring adaptive 
responses that fit neither the logic of bandwagoning nor balancing. Both Goh 
 Thayer, C. A., & S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. (2010). Recent 38
developments in the south china sea: Grounds for cautious optimism / carlyle A. thayer. 
Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.
 Michael Yahuda, “The Evolving Asian Order: The Accommodation of Rising Chinese Power”; 39
Jonathan Pollack, “The Transformation of the Asian Security Order: Assessing China’s Impact” 
in Power Shift, edited by David Shambaugh 
 Ross, Robert. (2007) “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and 40
Balancing in East Asia,” in William W. Keller and Thomas G. Rawski eds., China’s Rise and the 
Balance of Influence in Asia, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 121-145.
 Chong, Ja Ian. (2003) “Revisiting responses to power preponderance: going beyond the 41
balancing-bandwagoning dichotomy,” Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore 
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and White agree that ASEAN has lost its ability to control the Great Power 
dynamics that are now dominating Southeast Asia’s strategic architecture, 
despite the fact that regional institutions have been deliberately layered around 
ASEAN in order to reinforce its self-styled “centrality” to regional 
multilateralism. As noted further by Evelyn, as small or medium-sized states, 
Southeast Asian states have had a particularly difficult time adjusting to these 
new structural conditions. By and large, they have attempted to maintain a 
balance between the US and China by facilitating the retention of US 
involvement and forward deployment in the region, and by engaging China 
both politically and militarily.  
These scholarly works make an important supplement to the grand-theory 
approach by incorporating the smaller actors into the picture of hegemonic 
transition. Their aim is to give a more nuanced account for regional responses 
to China’s rise. The grand IR theory was focusing on the analysis of possible 
trajectories on a broad level as the grand IR theory literature had attempted to 
do, whereas the mid-range level theories were paying attention to the specific 
sets of tactics or strategies that smaller actors employed to cope with China’s 
economic expansion as well as perceived military assertions. The mid-range 
theory literature also gives a stronger regional focus.  
However, in this body of literature, Southeast Asia is often portrayed as 
having a unified stance. They could not explain changes in perception and 
response to China’s rise both within a country and across countries in the 
region. Specifically I refer to inconsistent and sometimes even contradictory 
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foreign policy and diplomatic rhetorics. For example, what explains the 
sudden shift in the Philippines’ stance on the claim of the Spratly Islands in the 
South China Sea by becoming more hostile and assertive towards China after 
Aquino III assumed office in 2010? And why did the Vietnamese government 
opt for the so-called “ally of convenience” strategy to cope with US against 
China in light of the South China Sea hostility? The ways individual Southeast 
Asian states’ engage with China have demonstrated a high level of 
inconsistency. Inconsistency does not necessarily contradict with the overall 
strategy that a state has taken to cope with China—whether it is hedging, 
binding, or balancing; here I am highlighting another important aspect—
change of perception of China’s regional presence and involvement. 
Perception is an important variable that unlike the general strategy, it operates 
at a different level. I argue that perception is equally important in defining the 
rise of China.  
2.3 Why Does Perception Matter?  
Why is perception important for us to better analyze the rise of China? 
Answering this question requires prior understandings of the factors that 
would have affected perceptions of China. The existing literature offers neither 
a clear definition nor systematic theorization for the ‘rise of China’. This 
concept is being treated as given, and understood as an empirical phenomenon 
of ‘the growing of influence with the intention of asserting hegemonic status.’ 
In terms of measurement, ‘remarkable economic growth’, ‘active participation 
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in regional and international affairs’, and ‘military modernization’ are proxies 
that are used as convenient indicators for the rise of China and ever since they 
have been closely associated with this concept.  
However, upon a closer examination, these indicators are only useful at 
telling whether China is growing when compared with itself, not whether it is 
rising to hegemonic status. The presentation of China’s rise in the current 
works often conflate growth with rise. According to Randall Schweller, Pu 
Xiaoyu, T.V. Paul, Deborah Larson, and William Wohlforth, rising states have 
a strong desire to seek for status recognition and respect.  For China to 42
become a new hegemonic power, it will firstly attempt to undermine the 
legitimacy of the hegemon, and along the process the emerging power will 
face various forms of resistance from other states to hegemonic domination.  43
Thus, the very idea of power rise cannot be viewed in isolation but to take into 
account perceptions of other states. China’s growing of influence begins in the 
Asia-Pacific, and its growth is being felt most strongly by its neighbors.  
Empirically, Southeast Asian states’ perceptions of China’s engagement in 
the region have played a significant role in depicting the contour of a rising 
China. China has become the most important economic investor in the region 
second to the US. The Chinese-initiated infrastructural projects in the 
Philippines launched under the presidency of Gloria Arroyo, for instance, were 
deemed as a great economic benefit for the Philippines, as proclaimed by 
 Paul, T. V., Larson, D. W., & Wohlforth, W. C. (2014). Status in world politics. New York: 42
Cambridge University Press. 
 Schweller, R. L., & Pu, X. (2011). After unipolarity: China's visions of international order in an 43
era of U.S. decline. International Security, 36(1), 41-72.
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Arroyo on the Philippine-China Friendship Day: “[both countries to] enjoy 
and cherish together in the fields of socio-cultural, economic, and education 
cooperation.”  Evidently, both China and the Philippines back then had 44
portrayed a positive and friendly image for each other. The relations of the two 
countires became hostile and intense over territorial claims after 2010. One 
think-tank report stated that “[If] China is increasingly aggressive in defending 
its territorial claims, it is partly because of the balance of the change of 
Philippine presidents.”  45
While the Arroyo administration emphasized the importance of economic 
cooperation, Aquino and his cabinet have decided to take a more assertive 
stance over territorial claims to defend national integrity. Here, I am not 
arguing that foreign policy shifts is tantamount to the change of perception of 
China and its rise, but these changes would be regarded as important indicators 
that help us to better understand the rise of China—whether a powerful China 
would be more assertive in projecting its strength, which would be seen as a 
sign of having revisionist intention. On the other hand, if China continued to 
focus on forging economic ties and not territorial claims, it is more likely 
China would be labelled as a status quo power, and China’s rise a peaceful 
rise.  
The policy-oriented works, which is a separate body of literature I have 
examined, are better at capturing more recent changes of political dynamics in 
 Elizabeth Ruth Deyro “In Numbers: Philippines-China relations”. http://www.rappler.com/44
newsbreak/iq/95744-in-numbers-philippines-china-relations (Accessed June 6 2016).
 Paterno Esmaquel II “Why China prefers Arroyo over Aquino”. http://www.rappler.com/nation/45
9128-how-china-views-aquino,-arroyo (Accessed June 6 2016).
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the region. Policy analysts are interested in the debates over current regional 
affairs and they have attempted to explain how regional actors have responded 
to China’s involvement in the region. Some of the most prevalent themes in 
the past five years are, for instance, the South China Sea disputes and the 
Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) programs.  
Arguably, however, this body of works generally lacks theoretical focus and 
generalizability. This is because many of them speak to a more general 
audience who are more interested in knowing ‘What is happening right now in 
the region?’ and not ‘How could we theorize these empirical phenomena?’ 
More importantly, many of the issues that have been discussed in those works 
were quite recent, which means there is insufficient evidence to test the claims 
and predications that have been offered.  
Nevertheless, one important contribution offered by these works is an 
illustration of responses to a rising power from the perspective of the smaller 
regional actors. As such, the illustration of responses to China’s regional 
involvement could be utilized as proxies to gauge state’s perception of the rise 
of China. In this case, the policy-oriented works serve as an important 
empirical source for my hypothesis-testing. In sum, my study offers a 
theoretically robust and empirically-informed framework that better explains 
how individual regional actors perceive and respond to the rise of China in the 
Asia-Pacific.  
The theorization of China’s rise in the present literature takes rising powers 
as given, and there is little conceptualization for the perception of rising 
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powers—why certain powers are considered by other states as rising to 
hegemonic status at some points of time. Certainly, indicators such as the the 
annual growth rate released by prestigious global financial institutions serve as 
legitimate criteria for the measurement of rising economies or powers. 
Similarly, one could roughly gauge a country’s military capability by looking 
at the arms the government has purchased or innovated. However, the meaning 
of a rising power changes at different points of time. Part of the central 
argument I am making in this study is that domestic political changes in 
individual Southeast Asian states will shape states’ perception of China’s role 
and status in the region. Inter-states interactions play a more important role in 
making the narrative of China and China’s rise. 
Inter-states interactions are shaped by a more complex combination of 
elements, and among them I argue that domestic politics, especially legitimacy 
crises, could drastically alter the perception of a rising hegemon. Therefore, a 
more important question that needs to be answered is: when and under what 
circumstances did Southeast Asian states start to recognize China as a rising 
regional hegemon? Answering this question is crucial to understand many 
other important questions that have been debated regarding China’s rise, such 
as: when did the discourse of ‘China Threat’ emerge? And why is this 
discourse getting more popular and salient in some states and not others? The 
same question we should ask, and is also applicable to ‘China’s peaceful rise’, 
 31
one which many scholars took for convenience to explain China’s “benign 
intention” as perceived by the region.     46
 The ‘benign intention’ argument can be found largely in policy papers which discuss 46
Southeast Asian states or ASEAN’s perception the rise of China. See, for example, Zhao 
Hong’s “The Maritime Silk Road and China-Southeast Asia Relations” ISEAS Perspective, No. 
35, 8 July 2015
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Chapter 3  Theory 
3.1  Increased Chinese Assertiveness: Alternative Explanation  
Before introducing my theory, I will firstly discuss alternative explanations. 
This is important as I will set the parameter of my theory after discussing 
alternative arguments that could have been raised. The most prominent 
alternative explanation for the change of Southeast Asia’s attitudes towards 
China is the increased Chinese assertiveness over disputed waters in the South 
China Sea.  There saw an increasing concern for regional prospect especially 47
among some claimants states which regard growing Chinese incursion as a 
sign of threat to their national integrity.  Simultaneously a new discourse in 48
the region on China has emerged supporting the view that a rising China is 
threatening. China’s changing approach to deal with the South China Sea issue 
has deteriorated its bilateral relationship with the some claimant states, 
especially with Vietnam and the Philippines since 2010. For example, since 
2011 China began to interfere with the commercial operations of oil 
exploration vessels operating in the Philippines and Vietnamese Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZ), and demonstrate its jurisdiction by deploying Chinese 
civilian vessels in disputed waters.   49
 A bulk of the scholarly articles and newspaper reports contend that the China’s assertive 47
approach to the South China Sea dispute starting from 2010 resulted in an escalation of 
tension.
 See, Jian Zhang, ‘China’s Growing Assertiveness in the South China Sea: a strategic shift?’, 48
in Buszynski and Roberts, The South China Sea and Australia’s Regional Security 
Environment, pp. 19.; Li, Mingjiang (2010), “Reconciling Assertiveness and Cooperation? 
China’s Changing Approach to the South China Sea Dispute, Security Challenges, Vol. 6, No. 
2, Winter, pp. 49-68. Thayer, C. A. (2011). Chinese assertiveness in the south china sea and 
southeast asian responses. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 30(2), 77.
 Thayer, C. A. (2011). China's new wave of aggressive assertiveness in the south china sea. 49
International Journal of China Studies, 2(3), 555.
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China’s projection of an assertive gesture in the South China Sea might 
have generated more speed-sensitive, exogenous effects on regional 
perceptions towards China. However, it explains only part of the story. It does 
not tell us, why, for example, China’s assertiveness had only severally 
deteriorated Beijing’s bilateral relations with Manila and Hanoi, and not with 
Kuala Lumpur.  So if perceptions of China’s rise are shaped and determined 50
only by the level of Chinese assertiveness, then why has it not significantly 
altered Malaysia’s perception of China’s rise and its relationship with China?  
Undeniably, disputes over territorial sovereignty and resources are crucial 
realities that have deteriorated individual Southeast Asian states’ bilateral 
relations with China, it is equally important to acknowledge that a large part of 
the rhetorics and narratives are constructed. I am not saying that events such as 
territorial disputes do not matter or matter less in shaping a state’s perception, 
what I am stressing here is the importance to identifying when and under what 
circumstances does the construction of narratives begin to matter.  
This study aims not to make an ambitious claim that everything about 
China and its rise is a domestic-oriented narrative. Chinese assertiveness, for 
example, certainly contributes to an increased concern for the future prospect 
of regional peace and stability. However, this explanation only justifies some 
cases and not others. Similarly, my argument which serves as a complement to 
the current approaches, will be useful to explain some but not all empirical 
 See, for example, Prashanth Parameswaran, “Playing it safe: Malaysia’s Approach to the 50
South China Sea and Implications for the US”. February 2015, Center for a New American 
Security
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observations. But this does not mean a non-universal explanation is less 
important or less credible. I am here to set the scope or the parameter of this 
work: the ’constructed narrative’ framework which I offer, is particularly 
useful in explaining inconsistent perceptions and foreign policy shifts. 
Domestic politics, in addition to Chinese assertiveness, also contribute to 
perceptual and foreign policy changes.  
       
3.2  Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy  
To obtain a more comprehensive understanding of a state’s perception of 
China’s rise empirically, I look into different variables that would matter in a 
country’s domestic sphere. Indeed, a state’s foreign policy is deeply informed 
by its domestic political agenda. For instance, if a country’s domestic interest 
is largely in favor of forging friendly relations with China, China will be more 
likely identified as a ‘peaceful or friendly’ rising power. On the other hand, if 
the country witnesses the rise of anti-Chinese nationalistic sentiment, then it is 
more likely that China would be identified as a ‘threatening’ or revisionist 
power. 
This study argues that domestic political changes will lead to a change of 
the content of the ‘China’s rise’ narratives. It is important to take into 
consideration of domestic politics because parts of the narrative are a result of 
political agenda shifts. As such, the literature which studies China’s rise 
should have taken domestic variables of individual regional actors into 
consideration in order to generate a more empirically-persuasive explanation. 
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I challenge the dichotomy of balancing and bandwagoning in the IR 
scholarship and argue that the two extremes of the continuum—total balancing 
or bandwagoning is rather rare in the real world. Southeast Asian states have 
collectively identified both ends as costly options. Historically, individual 
Southeast Asian states’ relations with China and other major powers such as 
the former Soviet Union and the US tend to fluctuate rather frequently. The 
smaller states in Southeast Asia have been constantly in searching of a way to 
cope with great powers that would allow them to maximize benefit without 
upsetting each one of them. In this situation, any attempt to explicitly 
balancing or bandwagoning with China would be deemed too costly a choice.  
In order to make sense of the kind of choice Southeast Asia has adopted, I 
ground my study in domestic politics by asking: how do changes of domestic 
political environment at different levels affect their stance on China? I argue 
that the rise of China is an intersubjectively constructed narrative through 
multilevel and multilateral interactions between China and individual 
Southeast Asian states. Traditional IR scholarship largely dismisses the agency 
of smaller powers while emphasizes only the competition between great 
powers.  In these works, regional players are treated as merely passive 51
recipients—have little choice but to respond to China’s rise vis-a-vis the US’s 
relative decline in a particular manner. However, I argue that power transition 
is not a game between great powers. Instead, China gained regional 
 Jonathan Pollack, for example, suggests that the Sino-US relationship in the Asia-Pacific 51
region is the key determinant for the emergence and transformation of a new regional order. 
See “The Transformation of the Asian Security Order: Assessing China’s Impact” in Power 
Shift, edited by David Shambaugh. 
 36
recognition by interacting, cooperating, and bargaining directly with the 
smaller-states.  
I ground my research within the domain of the intersection between 
domestic politics and international relations. I am going to demonstrate that 
the domestic domain matters. The Southeast Asia region has had experienced 
volatile political changes, both internally and externally. Some states have 
experienced more frequent legitimacy crises due to regime or leadership 
changes as compared to others. As Robert Putnam stated: “It is fruitless to 
debate whether domestic politics really determine international relations, or 
the reverse. The more interesting questions are ‘When?’ and ‘How?” Thus, I 
ask: When and how does domestic politics play a role in the construction of 
the rise of China narrative? 
Domestic politics has been studied and used by foreign policy analysts and 
IR scholars to explain foreign policy and diplomacy. Regime types, electoral 
cycles, bureaucratic politics, public opinion, and economic situation were 
some of the critical domestic factors that have been highlighted in the 
literature.  In the context of Southeast Asia, due to the presence of different 52
ruling systems, regime type has been regarded as the most critical determinant 
for the country’s foreign policy. However, this study points that there are other 
important variables in the domestic sphere that deserve more attention. 
Political legitimacy, I argue, has been a crucial factor in shaping the narratives 
of China’s rise. I will illustrate in the subsequent sections that political 
 See Brule & Mintz, 2006; Holsti, 1991; Levy, 1989; Levy & Vakili, 1992; Putnam, 1988; 52
Russett, 1993; Smith, 1996
 37
legitimacy matters for both Vietnam and the Philippines, which are countries 
of two different regime types. 
3.3 Politics of Asymmetry  
Apart from domestic politics, I also borrow insights from the concept of 
politics of asymmetry, which is an analytical tool applied by scholars such as 
Brantly Womack to examine interstate relations between the great powers and 
the smaller ones. Womack has called us to pay attention to the misfits between 
the mainstream IR theory which is derived from the European context, and the 
Asian politics. In particular, according to Womack, “nations are sovereign 
entities and Western international relations theory arose from the competition 
of roughly equal powers in Europe and then concentrated on great power 
conflicts… [It] is assumed that either the weaker state will balance its 
vulnerability by means of alliances with other states or it will be subject to the 
hegemony of the stronger state, either balancing or bandwagoning.”   53
I have pointed out that the balance of power theory and power transition 
theory are ill-suited to explaining Southeast Asia’s response to China’s rise in 
the previous sections. Womack’s approach to the study of international politics 
in Southeast Asia, that could be better understood as a political relationship of 
asymmetry, helps to explain the inconsistency of a country’s foreign policy 
towards China. Politics of asymmetry, referred specifically by Womack as the 
“disparity in capacity being the more than obvious fact about the relationship 
 Womack, B. (2006). China and Vietnam: The politics of asymmetry. Cambridge; New York;: 53
Cambridge University Press. 
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between China and Vietnam, but also applicable to other smaller powers.”  It 54
has always been the most important structural factor.  
Womack’s conceptualization of asymmetry is useful for the analysis of the 
fundamentals—the structural factors that have always determined the Sino-
Vietnam relationship. One important aspect of these long-term asymmetric 
relationships is that and the stronger cannot always impose its will on the 
weaker. “If an asymmetric relationship cannot be “solved” through force, then 
it must be managed by both sides.”  Indeed, in the long history of struggling 55
to either fight against or strike a balance between the great powers, Vietnam 
has developed a strategy that could best serve its national interest when 
necessary. The strategy of exploiting the great power competition or conflict 
(i.e. Sino-Soviet Split) to gain benefits from both sides had helped Vietnam 
fought against the US in the 1970s. Today, Vietnam is applying the same 
strategy while the US and China are competing for influence in the Asia-
Pacific.  
The asymmetrical relationship between China and its neighbours has a 
profound implication on the ways Southeast Asian states perceive and narrate 
the rise of China. Womack argues that an asymmetric relationship between 
two powers is not defined by the difference in capacities. “[Rather], mutual 
perceptions and interactions will be fundamentally shaped by the different 
situation of opportunity and vulnerability that each side confronts.”  More 56
 Ibid54
 Ibid55
 Womack, B. (2006). China and Vietnam: The politics of asymmetry. Cambridge; New York;: 56
Cambridge University Press, pp.17-18.
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specifically, under the asymmetric structure, both China and Vietnam would 
manage their foreign affairs with the acceptance of the relationship as normal, 
that the power of the stronger one would not be challenged and the security of 
the smaller side would not be threatened.  For example, Vietnam 57
characterizes Vietnam-Sino relations in the 1980s as a mixture between 
hostility and peaceful economic relations. The seemingly contradictory 
relations laid an important background for normalization in the early 1990s. 
As Womack further argued, normalcy is a negotiated and not imposed, 
relationship between China and Vietnam.  
In this connection, although China has always been presented as a 
superpower in the region in this regard, smaller states’ perceptions of China 
are in fact more nuanced. China’s rise would not necessarily be perceived by 
smaller regional powers as either a ‘bless’ or ‘threat’. On the contrary, China’s 
rise is to be understood as a mutual acceptance between China and the weaker 
ones. The relationship between a rising China and the smaller regional powers, 
is one that is negotiated, not imposed. The framework of asymmetry is a useful 
tool to conceptualize inconsistent or even the contradictory narratives in a 
country’s foreign policy discourses. 
The relationship of asymmetry also explains the reasons behind the 
emergence of competing narratives. The theory of asymmetry offers a more 
convincing explanation for inconsistent and ambivalent attitudes Vietnam 
adopted to cope with China both in the past and in the present days. If we are 
 Ibid57
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about to view asymmetry as a structural factor that has shaped the relationship 
between China and its small neighbors, according to Womack’s logic, the 
smaller powers prefer a less conflict-prone and a more accommodating 
approach to manage its relations with great powers. As noted by scholars and 
policy analysts, most Southeast Asian states have shown a remarkable degree 
of strategic ambivalence,  that states in this region have made conscientious 58
efforts to avoid appearing to take side with any of the great powers.  
In the next section, I will define and explain the key concept “constructed 
narrative” in this study, followed by the illustration of the causal mechanisms 
of my hypothesis.  
3.4  Construction of Narratives 
I define narratives as a state-specific story about China’s rise. To be more 
specific, the narrative about China as a rising regional hegemon is a 
domestically-oriented and state-specific piece of depiction that is made up by 
the state authority to justify and to serve the its political agenda. A narrative 
also justifies and informs a country’s foreign policy decision-making towards 
another country both rhetorically and strategically. When I say ‘made up’, I do 
not mean a fiction that comes out of nowhere; neither do I mean the overly 
exaggeration of an event. Under circumstances such as but not limited to, 
legitimacy crises, the state authority sees the need to make up a story to justify 
 See ROY, D. (2005). Southeast asia and china: Balancing or bandwagoning? Contemporary 58
Southeast Asia, 27(2), 305-322.; Percival, B., & Net Library, I. (2007). The dragon looks south: 
China and southeast asia in the new century. Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International.; 
Goh, E. (2007;2008;). Great powers and hierarchical order in southeast asia: Analyzing 
regional security strategies. International Security, 32(3), pp.113-157.
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a particular foreign policy or stance; this is the part of the story that I am 
interested in, and this is the kind of narrative about China’s rise that I am 
referring to. Narratives are exemplified through state’s official claims, such as 
leadership speeches or statements which are commentaries of another 
country’s intention or action. 
Some scholars have pointed out that Southeast Asian states’ foreign policies 
towards China are subject to, and are often response to China’s foreign policy 
shifts. For example, disputes over the Spratly Islands are particularly pertinent 
to the ways which Vietnam and the Philippines perceive China’ engagement in 
the region.  Perceptions of China’s incursions in the South China Sea have 59
had adverse effects on these countries’ incentives of forging closer economic 
ties with China.  
In response to this explanation, first of all I do not deny that factors such as 
the perceived Chinese assertiveness do not matter. However, as I have pointed 
out earlier, not all claimants states in the South China Sea have become 
extremely concerned about Chinese assertiveness. Brunei and Malaysia are not 
as vocal as Vietnam and the Philippines, and do not take it as a threatening 
sign. Having said that, China’s behaviors only outline the external condition, 
which defines the levels of perceived uncertainty. When there exists more than 
one dominant power in the region, and great powers are competing with each 
other for influence, this in turn increases the possibility of uncertainty that the 
smaller states seek a greater security or economic benefits under this 
 Atsumi Okabe “Coping with China” and Donald S. Zagoria’s “Joining ASEAN” in Vietnam 59
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circumstance. However, if we were to examine process of a country’s foreign 
policy decision-making, the internal condition is equally important. This is 
where my ‘constructed narrative’ argument comes in. The internal condition, 
which is the focus of this study, explains the reasons behind the emergence of 
a particular narrative.   
Domestic political changes could lead to an alteration of a country’s foreign 
relations, it diplomatic orientation and a specific set of policy. The critical 
juncture for this change to happen is when foreign policy shifts are perceived 
by the leadership to be necessary for domestic political changes in times of a 
legitimacy crisis under leadership transitions.  
A narrative which depicts the rise of China is a socio-political discourse 
constructed by the state to support and substantiate their foreign policy 
orientation. They explicitly address the country’s engagement of foreign 
affairs that speaks to its political interests, and it is one way to tell the story of 
domestic political changes. As such, changes within the domestic sphere are 
more likely to cause the narrative to be less consistent, with all other key 
variables remain unchanged.  
How does a narrative covary with domestic politics? Observation of 
variations requires the control of exogenous effects to rule out confounding 
variables. Hence, I choose to examine the critical junctures that have 
significantly changed the dynamics of the country’s domestic politics. In this 
regard, I am able to isolate the effects that are likely to be caused by other 
variables and therefore, better examine the causal relations between domestic 
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politics, particularly leadership transitions and the construction of a domestic-
motivated narrative about China. The influence of China’s rise is defined and 
shaped by a state’s domestic interests which is often contingent to leadership 
transitions. In the following section, I will explain in details the methodology 
and how I will conduct my empirical tests.  
3.5  Causal Mechanisms 
States experiencing or prone to legitimacy crises are more likely to participate 
in the construction of inconsistent narratives than states that are not 
experiencing or less prone to political legitimacy crises. Political legitimacy 
defines the conditions that lay out a country’s foreign relations and thereby, the 
basis for narrative construction. This is because when the ruling party or the 
current leadership’s political legitimacy is being questioned, restoration of 
political legitimacy will be prioritized. If the political legitimacy is perceived 
to be threatened by an external source, political elites who aim to strengthen 
the legitimacy would diversify domestic attention from the current domestic 
crises by making up an external threat.  
The rally ‘round the flag’ effect as a manifestation of nationalism for 
instance, is often used by the state to restore and bolster its political 
legitimacy.  It is mostly relevant when the ruling elites see the need to 60
construct an external ‘threat’ to bolster its legitimacy. Southeast Asian states 
 See, for example, Levy, Jack S. (1999). “Economic Competition, Domestic Politics, and 60
System Change: The Rise and Decline of the Anglo-Dutch Rivalry, 1609-1688.” In Great Power 
Rivalries, ed. William R. Thompson. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 191; 
Schreiber, Anna P. (1973), Economic Coercion as an Instrument of Foreign Policy: U.S. 
Economic Measures Against Cuba and the Dominican Republic, World Politics, 25, 3, 387–413.
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have explored China’s economic rise to fulfil domestic political interests—the 
economic benefit or political leverage against domestic rivalries.  
Vietnam makes a good example to illustrate the above point. The 
authoritarian regime is vulnerable to legitimacy crises although the ruling 
party has not been significantly threatened by other political parties. Drawing 
from Weber’s conceptualization of socio-economic legitimation, White 
contends that “For communist and other authoritarian systems, socioeconomic 
or “performance” grounds of this kind have typically been seen as the single 
most important basis upon which they may seek legitimation.”  In this regard, 61
if political legitimacy of an authoritarian state is being challenged and when 
political elites have no viable alternative sources to turn to, nationalism—the 
identification of an external threat will become a convenient tool for the state 
to exploit.  
Political legitimacy may be an issue of concern for states that are 
undergoing leadership transitions. When leadership transitions occur, 
especially when the successor sees the need to establish the authority by 
discrediting the predecessor(s). Very likely the new government would 
systematically dissolve and dismiss political sources of the previous 
government. In the Philippines, Aquino’s government heavily criticized the 
economic projects signed between China and his predecessor Arroyo for 
instance. This is largely the case whereby the state’s economic relations with 
the rising hegemon is determined by the patron-client relations or other forms 
 White, S. (1986). Economic performance and communist legitimacy. World Politics, 38(3), 61
pp.463.
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of informal relations as opposed to the formal ones, that the economic activists 
had contributed to corruption of the country.  
I am here to identify the scope and conditions under which leadership 
transitions lead to inconsistent narratives of the rise of China. The 
inconsistency of the narrative is particularly apparent when the legitimacy of 
the previous leadership is being challenged. Electoral means as a legitimate 
tool to enable leadership changes, will alter some if not all political objectives 
that the previous government envisioned to achieve. The creation of a different 
narrative of China is a deliberate, strategic choice attempted by the new 
government to establish authority domestically. As such, an inconsistent 
narrative will be observed under two possible conditions: one, leadership 
transition that involves the delegitimization of the previous government; 
Second, foreign policy shift would enhance the political legitimacy of the new 
government. Thus, I identify political legitimacy crisis a critical condition and 
leadership transitions critical disjunctures that determine the country’s 
domestic politics vis-a-vis its foreign policy. 
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Chapter 4  Empirical Testing 
  
4.1  Case Selection 
This study uses a small-n and cross-time comparison case study for empirical 
testing. As John Gerring has argued, case studies are especially appropriate 
when exploring new causal mechanisms.  Current approaches to study the 62
intersection between domestic politics and foreign policy are interested to find 
out a general pattern about the impact of domestic political variables on its 
foreign policy and diplomacy. For example, a bulk of the scholarship is 
interested in finding out how bureaucratic politics affect the foreign policy 
decision-making.  Another prominent research attempts to theorize the link 63
between regime type and foreign policy.  The scholarship has yet made an 64
effort to look at how political legitimacy would affect perception in this 
context. What I am trying to do here is to reveal the causality between the two 
variables. Since the rise of China begins in the Asia-Pacific and it has 
generated a greater impact on this region as opposed to anywhere else, I will 
select Southeast Asian countries for empirical testing.  
 Gerring, J. (2004). What is a case study and what is it good for? American Political Science 62
Review, 98(2), 341-354.
 See, for example, Morton Halperin, Priscilla Clapp, and Arnold Kanter’s Bureaucratic Politics 63
and Foreign Policy (2006), the book examines the role of bureaucracy in the US—civilian 
officials, political appointees, military figures, and the Congress—in formulating the country’s 
security policy. In particular, the book contends that foreign policy making is a complex process 
because different bureaucratic bodies have different priorities and interests when coming to 
foreign policy formulation and implementation. Bureaucratic manoeuvring plays an important 
role in influencing US’s international relations.     
 Democracy peace theory views democracies as a key factor for peace in the twenty-first 64
century, see, for example, Russett, B. M., & Oneal, J. R. (2001). Triangulating peace: 
Democracy, interdependence, and international organizations. New York: Norton. Some 
scholars examine the subtypes of a regime with the aim of capturing the nuanced political 
patterns in relation to foreign policy both within and across regimes. See also, Snyder, J. 
(1991) Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press; and Schweller, R.L. (2006) Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the 
Balance of Power. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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The criteria for selecting case studies are as such: first, levels of analysis—I 
examine political legitimacy crises and narratives constructed at the state-
level. The decision-making processes conducted by national political leaders 
are generally accountable to the state. Second, the independent variable is 
political legitimacy crises, I select countries that have in recent years 
experienced political legitimacy crises. To rule out the confounding variables, 
I select a country which has not experienced legitimacy crisis as a contrasting 
case. If a country fulfils the above mentioned conditions, and that domestic 
political legitimacy problems occur prior to narrative changes, then I can make 
a plausible claim that there is a strong causal relationship between a country’s 
political legitimacy and the narratives of China’s rise.  
In Southeast Asia region, two cases satisfy for these two conditions: 
Vietnam and the Philippines. I use the case of Malaysia to triangulate, and 
thereby test the robustness of my hypothesis. I demonstrate that Malaysia’s 
relations with China has not been adversely affected by the increased Chinese 
assertiveness in the region. Malaysia handled the South China Sea issues 
rather peacefully and quietly with China, “balancing its national interest of 
maintaining close economic relations with China with the alleged regional 
interest of ASEAN solidarity vis-a-vis China.”  In chapter 5 I will discuss the 65
differences between Malaysia and the other two claimant states in terms of 
perception and approach. 
 CHENG-CHWEE, K. (2008). The essence of hedging: Malaysia and singapore's response to 65
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Vietnam and the Philippines meet the three criteria and the two cases are 
highly comparable. Both have experienced political legitimacy crises at the 
national level to some extent. For the Philippines, it was the legitimacy crisis 
of leadership—Gloria Arroyo was brought down by Aquino III for rampant 
corruption. Vietnam after the year 2008 began to experiencing economic 
stagnation, a crisis that has challenged the legitimacy source of the ruling party 
which is based on a performance-based legitimation model. In addition, both 
countries are the claimant states competing with China over disputed waters in 
the South China Sea. In this aspect, I could isolate the exogenous effects 
caused by the territorial disputes.  
The empirical testing consists of two parts. The first part explores the 
historical trajectories of regional powers’ relationship with big powers. I argue 
that a narrative is historically contingent, and therefore the aim of drawing 
analogies from history is to show that the ‘constructed narrative’ argument is 
generalizable to explain more than one single case beyond the context of 
China’s rise. I will explain how leadership competition for political legitimacy 
have affected the portrayal and manoeuvring of an external great power in the 
past. I also aim to spell out the causal mechanism of my hypothesis through 
illustration using historical evidence. The second part examines how narratives 
of China’s rise is being constructed in today’s context. I examine Vietnam and 
Philippine’s perception and portrayal of China’s hegemonic rise today, and 
identify the causes which have led to the creation of inconsistent narratives.  
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I look at Vietnam’s foreign relations in the 1960s and 1970s in light of the 
Sino-Soviet split with China and the Soviet Union, as well as the Vietnam-
Sino relations in the early 1990s. Party factionalism in Hanoi served as an 
unique characteristic of Vietnamese domestic politics that had contributed to 
the construction of different narratives of big powers. Political legitimacy of 
the war-time Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) was defined primarily by its 
capability in defending the nation against the US in the Vietnam War. In the 
1960s and 1970s Hanoi struggled to maintain a favorable stance between the 
Soviet Union and China in order to gain as much benefit as possible by 
exploiting the Sino-Soviet split. Hanoi constantly adjusted its strategy to cope 
with China and the Soviet Union throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Along the 
process of foreign policy adjustment, Hanoi came up with different narratives 
to describe both China and the Soviet’s involvement in Vietnam and 
Indochina. These descriptions, I argue, had justified Hanoi’s foreign policy; 
and those narratives had gradually evolved to become Vietnamese official 
discourse on China in the Cold War phrase—a discourse which could be best 
characterized as a mixture of love and hostility.   
In the 1990s, Vietnam-Sino diplomatic relations was resumed with a new 
phrase of normalization. However, party split continued, and in the 1990s the 
party was split between the pro-Chinese group and the pro-US group. The two 
groups constantly debated with each other over an important issue of whether 
getting Vietnam was getting too close with China or the US. This debate is still 
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going on as factionalism continued to manifest itself along the pro-Chinese, 
pro-US, and the ‘neutral’ group in Vietnam today.  
I then turn to the Philippines, I examine Philippine’s relations with the US 
in the immediate post-Marcos era. The Philippines was the US close ally under 
president Ferdinand Marcos. However, Marcos lost the legitimacy and was 
overthrown through a mass protest known as the People’s Power Movement in 
1986. The group of political figures who toppled the Marcos regime believed 
that the US was largely responsible for supporting the Marcos dictatorship. As 
a result, Corazon Aquino, Marcos’s successor who was brought in to power 
through the People’s Power movement, had initiated the closing down project 
to remove the US military bases in the Philippines despite her personal pro-US 
preference,  and eventually led to a cooling-off period for their bilateral 
relations. Along the process of leadership transition, Manila made up 
narratives about the American imperialism and neocolonialism to counter the 
hegemonic discourse of American domination.  
4.2.1  Case Study I: Vietnam 
Political legitimacy in Vietnam is based on a the Vietnamese Communist 
Party’s (VCP) collective leadership. Although Vietnam is a communist 
country, unlike other communist countries of its time such as the former Soviet 
Union and China, political power was more dispersed in Vietnam that it was 
not concentrated in the hands of a particular person.  
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In Vietnam, collective leadership refers to the “decision-making process 
within the party in which high-ranking members, through bargains and 
compromises on goal priorities, achieved unanimity in endorsing policy 
guidelines and carried collective responsibility for their consequences.”  As 66
believed by Vasavakul, it was “the unity of the [collective] leadership that 
sustained the legitimacy of the party among both the political elite and the 
rank-and-file.”   67
In spite of being an authoritarian state, collective leadership has prevented a 
monopoly of power by one person and political polarization. There are three 
main principles that define the party’s approach to collective leadership. 
Firstly, decision-making is made collectively as a result of the maintenance of 
factional representation in both the Politburo, as well as regional and ethnic 
representation in the Central Committee. Secondly, the formulation and 
implementation of final decisions are achieved through bargaining and 
compromise on policies and strategies. As such, policies and strategies are 
synthesised. Lastly and most importantly, power is shared among key 
personalities and political institutions.   68
Collective leadership has had an important impact on Vietnamese foreign 
policy. The split between the pro-Chinese and the pro-Soviet faction of the 
ruling party between the 1960s and 1970s is one key determinant factor that 
has shaped its foreign relations with China and the Soviet Union. In particular, 
 Stephen J. Morris, “The Soviet-Chinese-Vietnamese triangle in the 1970s: the view from 66





factional disagreements were the source of the alternation of perceptions and 
narratives vis-a-vis China and the Soviet Union. 
The link between party division and Hanoi’s foreign policy is exemplified 
in Vietnam’s ambivalent attitudes towards China and the Soviet Union during 
the period of the Sino-Soviet Split. The prolonged war had forced North 
Vietnam to adopt a flexible strategy, that as long as the war went on, the 
Vietnamese communist party had to “maintain a middle-of-the-road position 
between Russia and China even though the two had fallen out.”  Since the 69
party was split into predominantly the pro-Chinese and the pro-Soviet factions 
which are equally powerful and influential. And since the decision-making 
was informed by the collective leadership, Hanoi kept strategic balance 
between China and the Soviet Union. This strategy is viewed by most scholars 
as a means upon which Vietnam could maximize its interests by obtaining 
more aid from both sides.   70
The disagreements between China and the Soviets over the transit of Soviet 
aid materials over Chinese rails placed Vietnam which was eager to obtain 
massive quantities of supplies of war-equipments, in a dilemma.  North 71
Vietnam turned to the Soviet for more ‘generous’ support was evident as 
“Hanoi preferred a strong offensive and called on China to supply more 
 Canh, N. V., & Cooper, E. (1983). Vietnam under communism, 1975-1982. Stanford, Calif: 69
Hoover Institution Press, pp.70.
 Hershberg, James G. (James Gordon), Chen, J., & Cold War International History Project. 70
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sophisticated weapons. China was not prepared to supply such weapons. On 
the other hand, it did not want Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The 
Chinese recommendation for Hanoi, therefore, was a strategy of protracted 
war.”  72
North Vietnam’s strategy in dealing with the Sino-Soviet split acted as a 
counter-force to the one-sided foreign policy orientation. Li points it out in his 
analyses, that Vietnam’s first priority was to ensure that military resources 
from the Soviet Union would be successfully transported to Vietnam. To 
govern its priority, Vietnamese leadership took up two measures. First, Hanoi 
exerted pressure on Beijing by informing Chinese leaders that Hanoi had 
signed an agreement with the Soviets and the Eastern European nations to 
arrange direct shipment to Vietnam harbors for war equipment and economic 
assistance. This was to signal China that with the assurance from the Soviet 
Union, Vietnam would be able to counter any possible Chinese aggression. 
When Soviet aid to Vietnam continued to increase, and surpassing Chinese aid 
by a large margin. Hanoi believed that “it could capitalize on and maximize its 
gains from the conflict between China and the SU.”  For this purpose, as 73
such, “only one month after Beijing turned down its request for additional 
assistance, the Vietnamese sought—and received—aid from the Soviet 
Union.”   74
 Morley, J. W., Nishihara, M., & NetLibrary, I. (1997). Vietnam joins the world. Armonk, N.Y: 72
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Secondly, despite of concluding a formal alliance with the Soviets, 
Vietnamese would not want to lose China’s support entirely. From Vietnamese 
perspective, China was an equally valuable supporter as a substantial quantity 
of aid came from China more directly and promptly than its Soviet 
equivalent.  To secure assistant from both “big brothers”, Vietnam kept a 75
‘neutral’ position between China and the Soviet Union on a strategic basis. 
Political legitimacy of the 1960s and 1970s North Vietnam government was 
determined by its credibility in fighting against the American troops. This 
national agenda set the tone for North Vietnam’s foreign relations. As such, 
North Vietnam’s foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s was primarily aid-
driven. Any constraint to its access to material aids from external parties 
would be deemed as a threat to its survival and hence, VCP’s political 
legitimacy. Confrontations between the Soviet Union and China in Indochina 
laid the overall context for Vietnam’s relations with its two significant external 
Others. North Vietnam’s choice not to side-line with either one of them was a 
strategic yet highly risky approach. It was not entirely intuitive for North 
Vietnamese leadership to adopt such an approach because it might have 
offended both Beijing and Moscow, and as a consequence, Vietnam would 
have lost support from the two most important external sources.  No doubt 76
Beijing and Moscow were both eager not to lose Vietnam in the Southeast 
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Asia battlefield—this had provided a favorable condition for the Vietnamese 
to implement their strategy.  
To keep the strategy work, Hanoi systematically constructed a set of 
narratives to address both its domestic and international audience via political 
rhetorics. When China was criticized by the Western media for “blocking the 
transit of equipment”, Vietnam stood up to defend China against the West by 
issuing a statement through its central news agency on Feb 28, 1967. Vietnam 
declared that China had “transported properly and according to schedule all 
aid materials from the Soviet Union and other nations to Vietnam.”  To justify 77
and to make the strategy of maintaining a stance of neutrality in the Sino-
Soviet confrontation work to its advantage, Vietnam came up a story about 
China’s positive engagement in the communist camp in Southeast Asia and put 
it up to the public front. It turned out that no matter what conflicts existed 
between the Beijing and Moscow, or how intense the conflicts became, as a 
consequence Vietnam managed to continue to benefit from the two countries’ 
delivery of material assistance. Partly because both China and the Soviet 
Union was reluctant to lose its leadership status in the communist camp, but 
more credits should be attributed to Vietnam’s strategic approach which had 
turned the situation to its own advantage.  
I point out that the stories which the Vietnamese government came up with 
to describe the two great powers’ role in Southeast Asia have determined the 
effectiveness of the strategy. The narrative about China being an important 
 Ibid77
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regional leader that is secondary to the Soviet Union in terms of influence and 
recognition created more room for Vietnam to manoeuvre between major 
regional powers. Competition between Beijing and Moscow for regional 
influence and leadership in Indochina created the larger context for the 
development of regional politics. However, regional politics was also 
informed and shaped by domestic politics in Vietnam.  
The existence of the pro-Soviet and the pro-Chinese factions in the party 
and the politburo means that a decision was to be discussed and debated before 
a consensus to both factions to be reached, with each being a counter-force for 
the other group. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Vietnam identified and 
portrayed China both as a ‘big brother’ and an ‘enemy’. As remarked by a 
Vietnamese diplomat to Nayan Chanda in 1977, that: “[In all history,] we have 
been secure[d] from China in only two conditions. One is when China is weak 
and internally divided. The other is when she has been threatened by 
barbarians from the north. In the present era, the Russians are our 
barbarians.”  Under this circumstance, North Vietnam constructed an 78
ambivalent image of China’s involvement in Indochina that was subjected to 
changes. For example, when Beijing was perceived by Hanoi to be less 
supportive to its decision to go more aggressive in the battlefield, the party’s 
pro-Soviet faction urged for a more consolidated ally with the Soviet. 
Similarly, the pro-Chinese group acted to prevent the party from falling 
completely to one particular power. North Vietnam’s attitudes towards China 
 Vietnam's future policies and role in southeast asia (1982), pp. 37.78
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were strategically ambivalent—positioning itself in a more flexible status and 
greater room for manoeuvring.  
Vietnam altered its foreign relations with other major powers again as a 
result of domestic legitimacy crisis from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. As 
noted by Thayer, political legitimacy since 1986 has largely rested on the 
economic performance—a performance based legitimacy depended on the 
ability in delivering economic growth.  Prior to the 1975 unification, 79
Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP)’s legitimacy was based on its leadership 
in national resistance against foreign intervention. Thayer also noticed that 
“although Vietnam remains a ‘soft authoritarian’ state, its political legitimacy 
rests on multiple sources including responsiveness to challenges from within 
and below to speed up the pace and scope of political change.”  Undeniably, 80
socio-economic performance has become the most important source of 
political legitimacy among a variety of other sources such as Marxist ideology, 
socialist objectives and popular mobilization after the launch of Doi Moi in 
1986.  The government was expected to provide social and economic benefits 81
for its citizens. It could be regarded as the single most important source from 
which communist regimes derive their legitimacy.   82
The implementation of the Doi Moi policy brought important changes to 
Vietnam’s foreign policy towards major powers, most significantly, the US 
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and China in the 1990s. Vietnam adopted a new strategy to cope with an 
economically expanding China. Hanoi aimed to forge a close economic ties 
with China with the aim to bolster its own economic growth. Thus, the 
normalization of Sino-Vietnam relations from the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War 
was another important turning point and policy shift. I wish to highlight that 
the normalization was a result of intensive debate between party factions. 
Donald Zagoria argues that there had been a debate within the top Hanoi 
leadership over two conflicting options. Factionalism continued to persist in 
the party between the pro-Chinese group and the ‘realist’ group. The pro-
Chinese faction, which was supported by older party officials and a group of 
military cadres, “stressed the common ideology ties of the two communist 
states, and the fact that they allegedly shared a common external threat from 
the West, particularly the US.”  This group supported the strategy of peaceful 83
evolution and to forge a closer relationship with Beijing. The realist faction, on 
the other hand, countered the pro-Chinese group’s claims while emphasizing 
China’s expansionist ambitions in the region historically, often at Vietnam’s 
expense. For a time during the early 1990s, the pro-Chinese group in Hanoi 
seemed to gain the upper hand, and finally in November 1991, Vietnam’s 
relations with China were fully normalized at both the party and the state 
level.  84
As part of the legacy of Vietnam’s complicated relations with China, the 
pro-Chinese would always be accompanied by a less supportive, if not anti-
 Donald S. Zagoria, “Joining ASEAN” in Vietnam Joins the World, pp.155.83
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Chinese group. Vietnam’s attitudes towards China often swings forward and 
backward rather frequently. Evidently, the good relations which had just been 
built up between China and Vietnam did not last long. By 1992, relations 
between the two countries were seriously troubled. According to Zagoria, the 
troubled relations was “largely [due to] China’s continued assertiveness in the 
South China Sea, where China’s claims overlap those of the Republic of China 
on Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, as well as of Vietnam. 
[And] since then the conflict has continued to escalate, a recent incident 
occurring in early 1995 when China took a step that marked a major turning 
point in its relations not only with Vietnam but with the entire region.”   85
However, as Le Hong Hiep, Brantly Womack and some other scholars have 
noted, that “changes in Vietnam’s foreign policy and its China policy 
originated first and foremost from the VCP’s domestic agenda of promoting 
economic reform and protecting the regime’s survival.”  As such, although 86
post 1990s Sino-Vietnam bilateral relations had been dominated by concerns 
for the territorial issue, both governments were determined not to let such 
problems fatter the development of bilateral ties.  
On the contrary, both parties preferred the framework of negotiation to 
manage and to resolve the problems, and most importantly, conflict between 
the two countries’ armed forces [had been] avoided.  Since 1991, political and 87
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diplomatic bilateral relations have developed quickly, that the two countries 
initiated an annual routine summit visits, giving the top leaders the opportunity 
to discuss economic reforms on a regular basis.  It is evident that the South 88
China Sea issue, despite being a recurring theme and potential source of 
conflict for both China and Vietnam, might not always trigger similar 
outcomes. VCP aimed to strengthen its political legitimacy that they 
suspended the territorial issue in exchange for greater economic benefits. In 
this aspect, in the 1990s Vietnam narrated China as a model to emulate, a 
guidance for its market reform from a socialist economy into a market-
oriented economy incorporable into the global economic system. Hence, in 
spite of the presence of territorial disputes, Vietnam had chosen to ‘ignore’ 
Chinese assertive claims. The ‘China as role model’ narrative is an illustration 
of a domestic-oriented foreign policy discourse reflecting a smaller state’s 
perception of a rising hegemonic power.    
Thus, one should be paying more attention to the causes behind Vietnam’s 
strategic makeup, and not simply focusing on the outcomes and concludes that 
it is a result of strategic reorientation based on realistic concerns. No doubt 
Vietnam’s policy adjustments in the 1990s towards China reflected the overall 
national interests, I urge this scholarship to pay attention to both the decision-
making process of Vietnamese foreign policy in the 1990s.   
Vietnam’s switch to performance-based legitimacy has had important 
impact on its foreign policy. The consistency of the country’s economic 
 Xiaosong, G., & Womack, B. (2000). Border cooperation between china and vietnam in the 88
1990s. Asian Survey, 40(6), 1042-1058.
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growth would directly affect the country’s legitimacy. The ruling party is now 
presented with serious challenges in maintaining “uninterrupted socio-
economic development.”  The situation has become especially challenging in 89
the context of the global economic downturn since 2008 whereby Vietnam has 
been trying to integrate into the system. Against this backdrop, nationalism 
regarding Vietnam’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, has been 
revived as an additional source of legitimacy in times of economic difficulties.  
4.2.2  Case Study II: The Philippines 
I examine foreign relations of the Philippines with big powers in the Asia-
Pacific at two critical junctures. The fall of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 marked 
the victory of the “People’s Power”, as well as a critical moment that had 
cooling-off the US-Philippine relations and set the prelude for the US 
withdrawal from the Subic Bay naval base in 1992. As a result of this drastic 
change in Philippine domestic politics, there witnessed a surge of anti-
American sentiment amongst political Leftists and ordinary Filipinos. The 
Philippines’ foreign policy had been oriented into a direction which had led to 
an cooling-off of its bilateral relations with the US.  
Political legitimacy in the Philippines is particularly pertinent to crises in 
times of leadership transitions. This is largely because patronage and 
paternalism defines the nature of politics in the Philippines, and patron-client 
 HIEP, L. H. (2012). Performance-based legitimacy: The case of the communist party of 89
vietnam and "doi moi". Contemporary Southeast Asia, 34(2), pp.147.
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relationship the centre of the legitimation model.  Clientelism persists across 90
the entire social system of governance. According to Muthiah Alagappa, “the 
efforts to legitimize political and economic power on a personal basis, as well 
as the deemphasis of the formal institutions and laws of the Philippines’ 
constitutional democracy, underline the need to distinguish between the 
legitimation of individual holders of political and economic power, on the one 
hand, and the legitimation of the nation-state and the regime on the other.”  91
Therefore, Philippine politicians are motivated to make a consistent effort to 
establish bonds with their constituency and to strengthen the idiom of the 
family in order to achieve political eternity. Many scholarly works and 
newspaper reports have shown, that Philippines politicians have typically 
expressed claims to legitimacy in terms of family. One example given by 
Alagappa, is that “the town mayor often represents the interests of a particular 
clan, and it is not uncommon for mayorships to be passed down within a 
family or rotated.”   92
Given that Philippine politics is dominated by a small number of extremely 
political and economically powerful families, political legitimacy which is 
based on personal ties and family relations, is particularly fragile. The 
 Many scholars of comparative politics and experts of the Philippines politics hold this belief. 90
Some of the more prominent ones such as Anderson, B. (1988). Cacique democracy and the 
philippines: Origins and dreams. New Left Review, (169), 3.; Kang, D. C. (2002). Crony 
capitalism: Corruption and development in south korea and the philippines. New York: 
Cambridge University Press., and Hutchcroft, P. D. (2001). Centralization and decentralization 
in administration and politics: Assessing territorial dimensions of authority and power. 
Governance, 14(1), 23-53.
 Alagappa, M., Case, W. F., & Khong, C. O. (1995). Political legitimacy in southeast asia: The 91
quest for moral authority. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, pp.138.
 Ibid., 156.92
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legitimacy issue will be manipulated by the new leadership as a way to justify 
the new government’s legitimacy to power. 
Regime legitimacy in the Philippines began to decline since the mid-1970s, 
and was faced with the most serious crisis in 1986 after the assassination of 
Ninoy Aquino. This assassination marked a critical disjuncture in the political 
history of the Philippines, both at home and abroad. The country’s foreign 
relations with the US had been significantly altered as a result of the rise of 
anti-American sentiment in the immediate post-Marcos era.   93
Corazon Aquino’s rise to power altered Philippine-US relations in a critical 
way. One direct as well as the most significant repercussion was the 
withdrawal of the US forces from the Subic Navy base and the closing down 
of the Clark Air base in 1991, followed by a cooling-off period of the bilateral 
relations between the Philippines and the US. The triumph of the ‘People’s 
Power’ movement changed the legitimacy basis of the country significantly to 
the extent that the Corazon Aquino had to accommodate the needs of the 
Leftists who were intensively suspicious of the US and who had played an 
important in toppling down Marcos, sometimes even against her own will.  94
Many opposition leaders also maintained an anti-bases position included 
prominent political figures such as Jovito Salonga, President of the Liberal 
Party, and several important senators.  In this respect, Aquino had to 95
 David Wurfel “Philippine Foreign Policy” in Wurfel, D., Burton, B., Stubbs, R., & Lim, L. 93
(1990). The political economy of foreign policy in southeast asia. Basingstoke, Hants: 
Macmillan.
 Bello, W. (1986). Aquino's elite populism: Initial reflections. Third World Quarterly, 8(3), 94
1020-1030.
 Baker, Anni. (2004) American Soldiers Overseas. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, pp.95
115-116.
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compromise her pro-US stance and elitist identity. One convincing explanation 
that would account for Aquino’s accommodating gesture to the leftists and the 
anti-American groups was the aim to consolidating her legitimacy to govern.  
Corazon Aquino’s political legitimacy is grounded in the people’s power 
movement, and there emerged a strong anti-American sentiment in Manila. 
Unlike her successor Marcos, Corazon Aquino was not being supported by the 
US, at least not from the very beginning of her candidature. As noted by David 
Wurfel, “Mrs. Aquino being most sharply critical of the US…[She] emerged 
without the prior blessings of the White House, which was loyal to Marcos 
almost to the end.”  Since Mrs Aquino’s administration was established based 96
on the overthrew of the Marcos regime, there emerged a new source of the 
country’s political legitimacy—one that was backed up by the collusion of anti-
Marcos forces fuelled by anti-American sentiment. 
Evidently, concerns about political legitimacy in the domestic sphere had a 
direct impact on its foreign relations with the US. Mrs. Aquino’s 
unprecedented popularity granted her a new autonomy in both the national and 
international realms. Unlike her predecessor Marcos, She was less compelled 
to use foreign policy as a tool to strike for regime survival. As such, the 
importance of the presence of the US military inside the country, was 
deliberately downplayed by Corazon Aquino.   97
 David Wurfel “Philippine Foreign Policy” in Wurfel, D., Burton, B., Stubbs, R., & Lim, L. 96
(1990). The political economy of foreign policy in southeast asia. Basingstoke, Hants: 
Macmillan.
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Another piece of evidence to illustrate how legitimacy problems surfaced 
attributable to the 1986 leadership transition was a real concern for Aquino. 
Such that she would be the sacrifice of her personal wills in exchange for 
support from both the socialist leftists as well as the right-wing Marcos 
loyalists in her cabinet. According to Aquino’s top advisers, “she has been 
forced to keep her feelings about the US largely to herself. Her government 
faces unprecedented pressure from liberal nationalists who supported her in 
the election…[And] it was the hardened leftists [Aquino] feared the most. It 
was obvious that they were mobilizing all their forces and their propaganda 
machine to force her hand on the issues concerning the US.”   98
The rise of anti-American sentiment in post-Marcos Philippines was partly 
responsible for the government’s decision on chasing out the US military 
presence. Corazon Aquino had favored the removal of the bases in the late 
1985 election. Evidently, this decision had caused some real concerns from the 
perspective of the White House. The article What Ronald Reagan should tell 
Cory Aquino illustrated how Washington was truly worried about the anti-
American faction of Corazon Aquino’s cabinet, and was hoping to make use of 
Aquino’s visit to the states as a chance to mitigate a variety of problems, 
including the growing communist insurgency in the Philippines.  Although 99
later Mrs Aquino softened her stance on the removal of the US military in 
 Mark Fineman, “US-Philippine Relations Turning Warmer in Post-Marcos Era” July 12, 1986.  98
(Accessed 16 June 2016) <http://articles.latimes.com/1986-07-12/news/
mn-22628_1_philippine-relations/2>
 Richard D. Fisher “What Ronald Reagan Should Tell Cory Aquino” September 12 1986.  99
(Accessed 17 June 2016) <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1986/09/what-ronald-
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 66
early 1986 with the ambiguous claim of “keep my options open” , this 100
position was carefully made to hold together the disparate wings of her 
coalition.  101
The foreign policy shift towards the US in the Philippines in the late 1980s 
was however, not an coincidence. Corazon Aquino came to power, not through 
elections, but through extra-parliamentary means which was largely backed by 
spontaneous people’s movement.  Massive popular support formed the basis 102
of her governance, and continued to serve as key source of legitimacy in the 
early post-Marcos years. Therefore Aquino had the incentive to keep her 
‘promise’ to her people, for otherwise she would have lost her presidency for 
not being able to keep the anti-American groups happy since they constituted a 
large body of the anti-Marcos crowd. Evidently, she kept her promise to the 
people, that ‘I will not allow myself to be stopped…[The] people are on my 
side and I can still draw large crowds in the squares.’  A feature that 103
underlined the critical difference between Marcos and Aquino’s government as 
a result of leadership transition was the offset of the interests of the ruling 
class that it became ambivalent toward the US.      
Aquino’s concern over the legitimacy of her governance altered Manila’s 
perception of the US as a regional hegemony. The ascendancy of Corazon 
Aquino as president created a popular sentiment not only among the leftists 
 Mynardo Macaraig, ‘Millions miss out under Arroyo’s watch, analysts say,’ Agence France 100
Presse, 26 June 2010.
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but also many average Philippine citizens against the continuation of the US 
military presence as “a violation of national dignity and sovereignty.”  Even 104
many within the Philippine elite argued that “the US presence was causing the 
Philippine military to rely too much on the US and neglect its own naval and 
air forces.”  The anti-bases stance held by the increasingly powerful leftists 105
and supported by more and more average Filipinos in the late 1980s 
pressurized the Philippine Senate to reject the newly negotiated base 
agreement and set in motion a total US withdrawal from Subic Naval Base and 
Clark Air Base by the end of 1992.  According to Khong, by 1989 it became 106
clear that “[The] negotiations had become entangled with a fierce domestic 
political debate within the Philippines. The surge in Filipino nationalism 
derailed the negotiations.”  107
One consequence of the change of perception towards the US, I argue, was 
the emergence of a new discourse on the US hegemony. The counter-US 
hegemony narratives became more prominent in the Philippines due to the 
change of political dynamics at home. The US was represented as an 
undesirable imperialist power in the Philippines’ official discourses after the 
anti-American nationalists emerged to become a powerful political force. At 
the national level, the people’s power movement to outs Marcos—the 
oppositions most invested in strident anti-Americanism were those who 
 U.S. alliances and emerging partnerships in southeast asia. (2009). Center for Strategic and 104
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restored order to the Philippines. Given the critical role these people had 
played in defining the country’s new source of legitimacy, they had become a 
part of the new settlement, and “their strongly anti-American views would 
presumably have been incorporated into the dominant account of the episode 
and the legitimating frame of the new regime.”   108
The anti-American narrative became even more prominent in the public 
sphere. According to a new report, “[When] Secretary of State George P. 
Shultz arrived in Manila, about 100 demonstrators waving red flags and 
shouting anti-American slogans greeted his motorcade from the airport. Many 
carried signs denouncing "U.S. Imperialism" in the Philippines, demanding the 
dismantling of two U.S. military bases here and declaring, "Shultz Go 
Home.”  The persistence of the anti-US hegemony narratives had long term 109
repercussions, particularly in shaping the post-colonial discourse in the 
Philippines, that “[The] legitimation crisis of imperial power frames all 
discourse on US-Philippines relations. Conceived as one ideological discourse 
mobilized for the post-Marcos era of mending “fences” and “bridges”.   110
Domestic competition for political legitimacy and influence had remarkable 
impacts on the country’s foreign policy vis-a-vis its significant Others. In the 
case of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos relied on American support for his 
presidency, and the US had backed him up against his political opponents 
 Katzenstein, P. J., & Keohane, R. O. (2007). Anti-americanisms in world politics. Ithaca, N.Y: 108
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almost till the end. Therefore, Marcos’s opponents who eventually came to 
power found it necessary to criticize the US for supporting Marcos at the 
expense of Philippine’s national interests. The strategic choice made by 
Washington not only sowed the seeds of the later anti-American movements, 
but also changed the way the US hegemony was being perceived by the 
Philippines.  
Narratives exerted a real impact on foreign policy decision-making. First, 
anti-American narratives had become a part of a chaotic democratic polity in 
the Philippines in the post-Marcos era. This polity has created “uncertainty 
about the strength and reliability of Philippine partnership.”  The closing of 111
the US bases would mean a great economic loss for the Philippine state.  For 
the Philippines, the biggest advantage deriving from the US military bases had 
been economic. “Some 70,000 skilled and unskilled workers have been 
employed there, with earnings of approximately $100 million annually in 
recent years. In addition, the bases have brought in US bilateral economic 
aid.”  The two countries had ushered into a severe cooling-off period after 112
the Philippine Senate rejected a new base agreement in 1992. The US security 
assistance fell to minimal levels, and US strategic planners bypassed the 
Philippines in their calculation. 
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Chapter 5 The Rise of China as a Constructed Narrative 
5.1 The Construction of China’s Rise  
This section examines the construction of the rise of China narratives in 
Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia. Vietnam after 2008 began to 
experience a legitimacy crisis due to the slowing down of the global economy. 
As such, Vietnamese government began to explore alternative sources of 
legitimacy, and eventually the government turned to nationalism. Since 2010, 
Vietnam has become particular about its territorial integrity, and started to act 
hostile towards China in the South China Sea.  
A similar trend is also observed in the Philippines, leadership transition 
from Gloria Arroyo to Aquino III was caused by a legitimacy crisis whereby 
Arroyo was charged for rampant corruption and electoral fraud. Philippine’s 
relations with China was rosy under Arroyo administration and her 
government identified positively with a rising China. However, Aquino III 
came to power by questioning Arroyo’s legitimacy to rule, and therefore for 
him to be identified as legitimate in the eyes of his people. Aquino III cut all 
the possible legitimacy sources that had once supported Gloria Arroyo. 
Therefore it was not surprising that Aquino III blamed China for indirectly 
contributed to the corruption in the Philippines. As a result, all major 
economic projects and agreements signed between Arroyo and China got 
cancelled. Like Vietnam, Aquino III also turned to nationalism in the South 
China Sea to boost legitimacy under his rule.  
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On the other hand, Malaysia has not suffered major legitimacy crises over 
the past decade, which is the timeframe I use for my hypothesis testing. With 
this case, I am hoping to show that China’s changing approach to deal with the 
disputed waters in the South China Sea is not a sufficient condition for the 
change of perception towards China. On the contrary, Malaysia’s portrayal of a 
rising China has been one that is positive and consistent.  
To facilitate my illustration, I present both the similarities as well as 
differences across the three selected cases in Table 1, I highlight that with 
other things being equal, legitimacy crises is a variable that has caused the 
construction of inconsistent narratives in Vietnam and the Philippines. Next, I 
present the most prominent narratives of China’s rise constructed in the three 
countries in Table 2.  
The methodology which I applied to obtain these narratives is Content 
Analysis—I select a variety of sources that are representative of the official 
discourses of a country including leadership speeches, interviews, and some 
secondary literatures (See Appendix). I examine articles or reports on the 
widely circulated publications in English including The Diplomat, East Asia 
Forum, and The Straits Times. Cross-referencing helps to improve reliability. 
To control for selection bias, I randomised the selection process and avoided 
cherry-picking the sources. For example, I used only neutral and simple 
keywords for keyword search (i.e. ’China,’ ‘China’s rise’, and ‘Vietnam’; 
‘Philippine and China’). I did not add adjectives such as ‘assertiveness’ , 
‘threat’, or ‘peaceful rise’ in my search that the search result might be skewed 
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toward a particular direction. This way, the source selection is one that is 
consistent. The timeframe is one that is less systematic because it is largely 
dependent on the availability of sources, which is mostly event-based. The 
tactic I applied to control for this matter is to supplement the primary sources 
with secondary scholarly sources, for which would provide me with a holistic 
view of the event.  
I coded each narrative from text descriptions of China’s rise and its 
implications; specifically, I ask: what does the rise of China mean to the 
country from the perspective of political elites? While coding, I took note of 
their expressions—the choice of words, tone and analogies. Table 2 also 
compares responses as well as foreign policies before and after the occurrence 
of the legitimacy crisis. I show that legitimacy crises affect not only the state’s 
perception but also behaviors in foreign policy decision-making. I will 
elaborate how narratives were being constructed in these countries in the 
following paragraphs.  
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Table 1 Case Comparison  
Countries 
Claimant 











Vietnam Yes Yes Yes Yes
The 
Philippines 
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Malaysia Yes Yes No No
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Table 2 Narratives of the Rise of China 
Countries Narratives of the rise of China










-helps to reduce 
poverty 
-friendly neighbor 
-total cooperation  
-provide stable and 














China since 1991 
-significantly 
strengthened 
bilateral ties  
-regarded China’s 
economic reform 
as a role-model  










-old friends and 
old enemies 










-desire to become a 
global leading 
superpower  
-regards the US as 
a threat and have 
the intention to 




-revisionist power   
-Hanoi decided not 




Nguyen Phu Trong 
and president 
Truong Tan Sang’s 
embrace the idea 
that Beijing is a 
“good comrade.”  
-avoid taking 
moves that could 
provoke Beijing  
-started to enhance 
its external defense 
capacity by 
purchasing arms 




issues, the trading 
relationship 





2009 and 2010 
have been 
enhanced. 


















country in the 
region and in the 
world 
-significant 
opportunity for the 
Philippines 
-signed 65 bilateral 
agreements with 






such as the ZTE 
and North Rail 
projects 
-Arroyo herself was 
the founding 
member of APCU 
-China emerged to 
become one of the 
Philippines’ biggest 
trading partners 
and an important 
foreign investor  
-strict adherence of 
the Philippines to 
the One-China 
Policy  













-stirring tension in 
the region 
-likened the Nazi 
Germany  








-played down the 
value of China’s 
economic 
investment  
-took a position of 
patriotism which is 
largely anti-China 
-renamed the 




China entered into 
by the previous 
government have 
been suspended or 
cancelled 
-took a multilateral 
track approach (i.e. 
ASEAN, East Asia 
Summit) with the 
hope of binding 
and socializing 
China into the 
framework.  
-advocates for a 
rules-based 





project a more 
credible defense
Narratives of the 
rise of China




towards China Countries 
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Malaysia -a force for peace 
and stability  
-enhance the 
security of the 
Straits of malacca  
-responsible 
stakeholder in the 
security of 





-will never seek 
hegemony 
-fully committed to 
the Declaration of 
the Conduct of 
Parties in the 
South China Sea 
-low-key in its 
response to the 
SCS issue 
-tried to avoid 




China in many 
important sectors 
including security 
and defense.  
-prioritize 
productive ties 
with China and 
emphasize the use 
of diplomatic 
means in managing 
the disputes. 
Narratives of the 
rise of China




towards China Countries 
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Vietnam’s perception of China and foreign policy is influenced by two 
major domestic factors: rising nationalism with regard to the maritime 
territorial disputes with China, and disagreements between party leaders on the 
positioning of China in the country’s future foreign policy.  The 2008 global 113
economic crisis has deteriorated Vietnamese economy.  As illustrated in the 114
above section, post-reform Vietnam regarded constant economic growth as 
core to the party’s legitimacy. 
Consequentially, in response to the country’s poor economic performance 
after the slowing down of the global economy in 2008, Hanoi attempted to 
bolster its legitimacy from additional sources to supplement its performance-
based legitimacy.  According to Le Hong Hiep, “Among the most important 115
sources that the CPV has resorted to is nationalism.”  The territorial disputes 116
with China over sovereign claims of the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the 
South China Sea has become a focal point in bolstering its nationalist 
sentiments. Importantly, to quote directly from Le’s analyses, that “[Although] 
Vietnam’s disputes with China has been a long standing issue in bilateral 
relations, it is noteworthy that Vietnam’s position on the dispute and its 
reactions to China’s moves in the South China Sea have been particularly 
strong and bold in the past few years. Although tensions in the South China 
 “China’s relations with Burma, Malaysia, and Vietnam” A testimony by Murray Hiebert, 113
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) May 13, 2015
 HIEP, L. H. (2012). Performance-based legitimacy: The case of the communist party of 114
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Sea have been rising for a variety of reasons, including increased competition 
for access to maritime resources and China’s more assertive policy, the CPV’s 
revival of nationalism at a time of economic difficulties has also become an 
important driver of the dispute.”  117
The significance of Vietnamese government’s turn to nationalism against 
China since 2010 goes beyond the rally-round-the-flag effects. More 
importantly, disputes with China has in the effect exacerbated the economic 
turmoil in Vietnam. It suggests that nationalism has become an additional 
source of legitimation for the communist party in Vietnam to “offset the 
negative effects that economic difficulties have generated on this performance-
based legitimacy.”  However, the strong emphasis on nationalism as a source 118
of legitimacy only in times of economic downturns and when performance-
based legitimacy is in decline. 
Vietnam’s construction of China as a rising regional hegemon follows 
historical trajectories in the 1970s and 1990s. The decline of political 
legitimacy coupled with party factionalism, together informed the narratives 
about China’s rise which we are observing today. Party factionalism prevails 
and the debate about the position of China in foreign policy making continues 
between the pro-Chinese and the pro-US elites. As such, Vietnamese narrative 
of a rising China looks like a multifaceted image.  
Perceptual inconsistency is reflected in Vietnamese attitudes towards China 




seeking Vietnamese about their attitudes towards China shows that 71 percent 
of Vietnamese believe China will be Asia’s future leader, and 56 percent are 
comfortable with this outcome.  Their perceptions towards China had been 119
drastically altered just six years later, according to a Pew Research Center 
survey on global attitudes in 2014, only 16 percent of Vietnamese reported to 
have a favourable view of China, the second lowest level in Asia following 
Japan.   120
Notably, perceptual inconsistent does not necessarily create contradictory 
narratives. Next, I am going to demonstrate how competing narratives and 
discourses were being constructed by different authoritative bodies to 
strengthen their own political interests. In May 2014, China installed the oil-
rig in the disputed waters which both China and Vietnam claim sovereignty 
near the Paracel Islands. The rig incident stirred a storm in the South China 
Sea as both Beijing and Hanoi regularly deployed vessels to the disputed areas 
and the tension had rapidly escalated. In response to perceived threat, 
protesters in Vietnam seized the opportunity to urge for domestic political 
reforms to gain leverage and to stand up more forcefully to China.  
However, despite the increasing demand for the government to take up a 
more forceful stance against China, the attitudes towards China are largely 
informed and determined by the preferences of the most influential 
government officials. According to a 2014 commentary report, “[Right] after 
 Whitney, Christopher and David Shambaugh. “Soft Power in Asia: Results of a 2008 119
Multinational Survey of Public Opinion.” The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. 2008.
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the oil rig withdrawal, sources revealed that Dinh The Huynh, a pro-China 
camp member who heads the Communist Party’s Department of Propaganda 
and Education, instructed the media not to go further to discredit China and 
make it lose face because of the move”  Further supported by Southeast 121
Asian specialist Carl Thayer, that the pro-Beijing group would avoid future 
conflict with China, and self-censor itself. “They would veto any policy likely 
to arouse Chinese ire. They would in effect bandwagon with China, that is, 
avoid criticism of China in the expectation of Vietnam would be rewarded 
economically for its good behavior.”   122
Inferring from Dinh The Huynh’s new approach to deal with China over 
territorial claims, one can plausibly argue that there is a correlation between 
party factions and the perception of and subsequently the depiction of China’s 
rise. Today, the decision-making body of the Vietnamese Communist Party 
had been split into three camps.  
The first one led by Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung that wanted to 
pursue a proactive foreign policy towards China, and seek support from Japan 
and the US to balance China. On the other hand, the group seeking to forge a 
closer ties with China, led by Party chief Nguyen Phu Trong, is concerned that 
getting too close to the US would result in negative pressures or even 
sanctions by China. This division partly explains why certain narratives 
emerged to become more prominent than others. The victory of Nguyen Phu 
 Teddy Pham “A US-Vietnam Alliance? Not So Fast”. The Diplomat, 4 August 2014. 121
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Trong who was re-elected to the second five year term as General Secretary 
marked the triumph of the pro-Beijing group over the pro-US group led by 
Trong’s major political rival Nguyen Tan Dung. The pro-Beijing leaders will 
come to rule the country. Analysts therefore pointed out that a closer strategic 
relations between the US and Vietnam is less likely to be materialized anytime 
soon.  A Washington-based Asia analyst Zachary Abuza said. “The 123
Vietnamese have buckled to Chinese pressure. A majority of the Politburo is 
unwilling to stand up to China at this time.”  124
In sum, the continued contestation between the pro-Beijing and pro-
Washington groups means that foreign policy change is possibly a constant. 
Interestingly, whether or not China is acting assertively in the disputed waters 
has become less of a concern for the Vietnamese government whereby 
domestic division seems to matter more in terms of orienting the foreign 
policy both rhetorically and strategically. China’s retreat has come at a 
“convenient juncture for the pro-Chinese faction of the party to preempt any 
planned legal action against China and thwart the highly anticipated alliance 
with the US.”  The post-2008 economic downturn in Vietnam gave the 125
government a greater incentive to exploit nationalism as an alternative source 
of legitimacy. Given there exists two opposing views regarding China within 
the Vietnamese leadership, therefore competing narratives regarding China’s 
role in the region will emerge. Legitimacy crises are critical disjunctures as 
 Shannon Van Sant “Vietnam Political Transition May Improve China Ties” Voice of America, 123
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political rivalries would size the opportunities to discredit the current 
leadership of the secretary general. For instance, the pro-US group leader 
Dung has spoken out strongly in public and asserting that “[Vietnam] would 
consider taking legal action against China. In addition, Dung actively enlisted 
US support to balance China’s growing assertiveness in the region.”  The 126
persistence of party factionalism means that the narrative about China’s rise is 
constructed and will be constantly changing, as opposed to a fixed one.  
The year 2010 witnessed the delegitimization of Gloria Arroyo and her 
administration in the name of ‘People’s Power’ (a term emerged firstly in 
1986). Philippine’s perception towards China’s continued economic expansion 
in the region has changed. According to Thompson, “[The] 2010 elections in 
the Philippines suggest that the long dominant political narrative of ‘rich-
versus-poor’ has been challenged by ‘reformist’ appeals for good 
governance.”  Noynoy Aquino revived calls for clean governance which he 127
identified the “straight path” using the unpopular Arroyo administration—
widely believed to have been the most corrupt in the post-Marcos Philippines—
as a convenient foil. “Aquino had inherited the legacy of his saintly mother. 
He is thus viewed by Filipinos as a political descendent of people’s power, 
with strong upper class backing. His popularity and partly the legitimacy of 
Aquino’s new government, is largely based on a reputation for personal 
 Ibid126
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honesty and for his ability to keep family and friends away from corruption 
scandals.”   128
The rise of China had once been portrayed by the Arroyo administration as 
a great source and opportunity for regional stability and development, that the 
bilateral relations between the Philippines and China was characterized as 
enjoying a “golden age of partnership” which was attributable to mutual 
efforts made by the two countries.  What happened next when Aquino III 129
became the president in 2010 was crucial for the understanding of the 
country’s revised foreign policy towards China—nationalist-oriented with the 
emphasis on the governance of territorial integrity.  
One immediate outcome of leadership change was the termination of 
several major infrastructural projects founded by the Chinese government 
including the $329.48-million National Broadband Network project with 
China’s Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) Corp and the 
North Luzon Railway System (North Rail) project.  China’s economic 130
investment in the Philippines was perceived by the new government under the 
leadership of Aquino as a curse rather than a bless which had created more 
rampant corruption and social dissonances in the country. Drawing reference 
on policy shift led by leadership change, I further argue that the reexamination 
 Ibid128
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of the two countries’ economic cooperation was a tactic employed by Arroyo’s 
successor to consolidate its legitimacy basis.  
Leadership transitions in the Philippines were often accompanied by 
legitimacy crises. According to a paper generated by RAND Corporation 
which examines Philippine response to China’s rise, the paper notes that there 
has been an enduring political instability since the fall of Marcos in 1986, the 
outcome being that political leaders were more inclined to “focus on short-
term political manoeuvring” rather than foreign and security policy 
strategies.  The cumulative effect is the tendency of the ruling political elite 131
to act in reactive response to foreign initiatives and external developments or 
crises.  Domestic political instability has played a critical role in shaping 132
Sino-Philippine relations, and “[A] key determinant of the Philippines’ 
response to the rise of China is the nature of the state, specifically its relative 
internal instability.”   133
The RAND Political analysts believed that as a consequence of domestic 
political instability, Philippine’s ability to play a more active role in the South 
China Sea vis-a-vis China was constrained. “These weaknesses, combined 
with the prospect of China-oriented economic growth, have produced a policy 
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of general accommodation toward China—an orientation that is likely to 
continue.”  However, this statement has been proven wrong when Aquino III 134
became the president in 2010, Philippine’s relations with China had 
significantly declined ever since. Leadership transition from Gloria Arroyo to 
Aquino III was accompanied by a serious legitimacy crisis which questioned 
the credibility of Arroyo administration, and this domestic political shift had 
altered Philippine’ perception of China’s rise and foreign relations with 
Beijing in substantially. First, unlike his predecessor Arroyo, China’s 
economic investment in the Philippines was no longer viewed by Aquino III as 
a great economic benefit, but a source of corruption; second, Aquino played 
the nationalism card in dealing with the South China Sea issues as a tactic to 
add weight to his government’s legitimacy and the cohesion of his party 
profile. 
It is not surprising that Aquino III, after became the president, began to 
crush down the sources including external ones that had once supported his 
predecessor Arroyo’s government by launching the large-scale anticorruption 
campaign. This is largely because Aquino won the election partly by its ability 
in discrediting Arroyo’s government for causing one corruption scandal after 
another  and  promising his people a “clean government and rule of law”   135
The delegitimization of Arroyo had adversely affected Philippine-Sino 
relations because many China-founded economic projects signed between 
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Arroyo and Beijing were involved in the corruption scandals. It was not just 
convenient but also legitimate for Aquino to cancel those corrupted projects 
and to frame China’s economic investment in a negative way. Evidently, 
multiple sources have revealed that Arroyo and her major patron De Venecia 
who initiated the economic projects with China had been heavily penalized for 
selling Philippines’ integrity in exchange for Chinese money.  The Joint 136
Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) Controversy was such example, that 
senators alleged that “the agreement weakens the government’s position in its 
claim over the disputed islands.”  They further alleged that “it is a 137
“precondition” set by China in exchange of some loan agreements. China has 
committed Philippines $2 billion USD a year in loans after signing the 
agreement. President Gloria Arroyo is suspected by some legislators to be 
hiding the facts that the agreement.”  As a consequence of the controversy, 138
some Philippine legislators became even more suspicious by increasing 
Chinese influence in the Philippines. A piece of evidence to illustrate the US’s 
concern came right after the agreement is that “the US was “pissed off” by the 
Philippines’ deal with China, signifying a war of the US and China for 
dominance in the ASEAN region.”   139
Leadership transition from Arroyo to Aquino in 2010 presented a critical 
turning point of Philippine foreign policy towards China. First of all, major 
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loans and investments agreements entered into the Philippines by the Arroyo 
administration remain unimplemented, having been either suspended or 
cancelled due to corruption and collusion between Arroyo allies and their 
would-be Chinese partners.  Perceptions of China and its engagement in the 140
region had been reoriented. For example, a poll of 33 nations done in January 
2006 by GlobeScan and the Program on International Policy Attitudes shows 
that more than 54 percent of Filipino respondents had a favorable view of 
China.   141
Nationalist discourses about disputes with China in the South China Sea are 
evidently products and processes of state construction. One crucial rhetoric 
which Aquino applied to buy himself votes as well as popularity is taking up a 
strong stance with China over disputed waters. Evidently, Aquino’s ‘hardline’ 
position on the territorial dispute made him popular as well as a surge of anti-
Chinese sentiment stoked by a nationalist literati.  Today, issues related to 142
the South China Sea turned out to become a regular topic of animated 
discussion in the Philippines, “if not outright sensationalization, in the 
Philippine media and among ordinary citizens.”  One could say that the 143
nationalist discourses only became more prominent in both the government 
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and public sphere after Aquino became the president, as “[Back] in the Arroyo 
administration days, barely anyone knew much about the South China Sea 
disputes.”  In sum, narratives of China’s rise in the Philippines in the recent 144
years were largely a domestic story. Aquino’s concerns over his political 
legitimacy motivated the construction of a set of nationalistic-driven, anti-
Chinese narratives.  
Malaysia’s perception of the rise of China, by contrast, remains relatively 
consistent, and it is independent of the South China Sea issue throughout the 
last twenty years. As noted by many Malaysian specialists and reporters, 
Kuala Lumpur continues to adopt a quiet and “playing it safe” approach in 
dealing with the South China Sea issue even when there saw an increased 
Chinese incursions since 2011.  Malaysia’s way of managing its foreign 145
relations with China differed greatly from Vietnam and the Philippines’ 
approach. A key variable that would explain this difference is the absent of 
major political legitimacy crises in Malaysia. Unlike the other two countries, 
the government of Malaysia has not been discovered to be seriously lacking in 
political legitimacy.  Case shares Crouch’s view and argues that since the 146
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1970s, the government led by UMNO, although has faced three strain points, 
“it has never slipped into a legitimacy crisis.”   147
Government legitimacy in Malaysia has not seriously suffered because of 
electoral matters in Malaysia,  which has an important implication on its 148
foreign policy towards China. Legitimacy crises in Vietnam and the 
Philippines have triggered anti-China nationalism vis-a-vis China’s perceived 
assertiveness in the South China Sea. In the case of Vietnam, post-2008 
legitimacy crises undermined the credibility of the ruling party which is based 
on a legitimation model of sustained economic performance. And the 2010 
Leadership transition in the Philippines was largely a consequence of the 
delegitimization of the Arroyo’s government. Competition for electoral victory 
in the Philippines and power struggle within the Vietnamese party makes the 
country’s foreign policy more prone to domestic political changes, especially 
legitimacy crises.  
However, in Malaysia, the long-standing ruling party UMNO manages to 
secure its legitimacy to rule, in addition to the absent of viable counter-forces 
to generate a crisis from inside. Unlike Vietnam, economic performance is 
crucial for Malaysian government to maintain its credibility, but it is not the 
only source of legitimation; the party’s ability to maintaining Malay 
dominance and articulating certain interests for non-Malay is also critical to 
 William Case. “Malaysia: Aspects and Audiences of Legitimacy” in Alagappa, M., Case, W. 147
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retime survival in the eyes of the majority.  Thus, the government of 149
Malaysian was not heavily contested when its economic growth slowed down 
right after the 2008 global economic crisis. Domestic political stability 
provides Malaysia with a more predicable environment for building foreign 
relations with the outside world.  Malaysia’s China policy reflects the ruling 
elites’ desire to “capitalize on the big power’s rise for the ultimate goal of 
enhancing and justifying its political authority at home.”  As such, 150
Malaysia’s perceptions of China’s rise maintain a high level of consistency as 
there are no internal distracting forces to serve the source of alternative 
narratives.  
The consistency of Malaysia’s attitudes towards a rising China is reflected 
both in state’s rhetoric and foreign policy. As China’s largest trading partner 
among ASEAN countries, Malaysia identifies a rising China as a key foreign 
investor which is critical to Malaysia’s economic growth. Kuala Lumpur has 
always been using narratives to signalling Beijing of Malaysia’s friendly and 
cooperative attitude. For instance, former Prime Minister Mahathir had spoken 
to the public that “[China] will never seek hegemony and will never do things 
to harm us.”  In spite of being confronted by Chinese assertiveness, Prime 151
Minister Najib continued to refuse to identify that the rise of China posed a 
threat to regional security. He further argued that “China was a force for 
stability because it required a peaceful regional environment in which to 
 Muthiah Alagappa, “Seeking a more durable basis of authority” in Alagappa, M., Case, W. 149
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pursue economic development.”  Although in recent years Malaysia is 152
becoming increasingly vocal over perceived Chinese assertiveness, that a 
counter-discourse which advocates for a stronger stance has emerged. 
Malaysia’s overall strategy with China has not yet changed. As noted by 
several analysts, “even the more vocal protests by Malaysia have been 
carefully calibrated to avoid souring relations with China.”   153
Clearly, Southeast Asia’s perception of Beijing’s revised approach to 
managing disputed waters since 2010 is not homogenous. The way China 
carried herself in the region might have caused an overall escalation of tension 
in the South China Sea, however, individual states had the autonomy to flame 
it up or proactively to scale it down peacefully. In contrast to Vietnam and the 
Philippines, to upset China was never Malaysia’ intention; the government 
continues to be cautious in deploying its capabilities vis-a-vis China by calling 
for a full implementation of the Declaration of Conduct (DoC) on the South 
China Sea, which is China’s preferred method of dealing with the disputes.  154
Malaysia’s framing of a rising China as a ‘non-threatening’ and ‘non-
expansionist’ hegemony demonstrates the constructive nature of perceptions of 
China’s rise in Southeast Asia. 
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5.2 Cross-Case Comparison      
By comparing and contrasting Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia’s 
perceptions and responses in relation to a rising China today, I highlight three 
major differences observed across the three countries that would be useful for 
the future study on the rise of China (Refer to Table 2). One, both Vietnam and 
the Philippines played the nationalism card to craft a stronger stance on the 
territorial issue, the two countries differed on the fundamental level. The 
Philippines under Aquino III took a nationalistic turn and re-oriented its 
foreign policy towards China based on its nationalist agenda; Vietnam’s new 
approach, on the other hand, should be understood as a battle of the rhetoric as 
opposed to a total strategic shift.  
Two, countries experience domestic legitimacy crises are more likely to 
experience more drastic foreign policy shifts. In this case, the 2010 legitimacy 
crisis in the Philippines was both the cause and outcome of leadership 
transition. Although Vietnam was experiencing the erosion of the party’s 
legitimation due to the slow down of the country’s economic growth, Vietnam 
did not experience regime shift or political chaos. Thus, Vietnam’s policy 
towards China on its strategic front remained less inconsistent.  
Three, ‘The rise of China’ contains more nuanced meanings that the study 
on the implications of China’s rise should not be reduced to the hypotheses of 
‘threatening’ an ‘non-threatening.’ Instead, the rise of China should be treated 
as a complex of discourses, some are even self-contradictory, constructed by 
individual state actors driven by domestic interests.  
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Vietnam’s approach to the perceived Chinese assertiveness differed from 
the Philippine’s, that Vietnam began to stand up to China vocally, but 
maintained a positive party-to-party ties with China. For Hanoi, maintaining 
the friendship with Beijing is critical for economic development and security. 
Evidently, notwithstanding disputes with China in the South China Sea, 
Vietnam’s economic relations with China have been strengthened, and in 
2013, China surpassed Japan to become Vietnam’s largest trading partner.  In 155
this regard, Hanoi is reluctant to take the first move without first calculating 
Beijing’s likely reaction. As noted by a few regional experts “[To] date, even 
as it has protested the oil rig and China’s cordon around it, Hanoi appears to be 
trying to avoid taking moves that could provoke Beijing, such as increasing its 
naval presence in the area or inviting the US Navy for port visits.”  Hanoi’s 156
preference to maintain a cooperative relationship with Beijing that it will not 
be interrupted by territorial disputes is reflected in their attitudes towards the 
anti-China nationalist movements at home. Despite the fact that the 
government had allowed the gathering of protestors in urban areas such as 
Hanoi, the state quickly dissolved the crowds and instructed the media to 
silence public debate on the South China Sea.  This crackdown was, 157
however, unsurprising. Hanoi was motivated by its desire not to further 
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damage relations with Beijing.  Between 2010 and 2014, “Hanoi and Beijing 158
have continued to expand their diplomatic and party-to-party ties and appear to 
be seeking ways to prevent their maritime disputes from spilling over into 
other areas of the relationship.  Overall, in spite of the conflict of interests 159
between the two countries over territorial disputes in the past few years 
whereby the tension has been escalated, Vietnam-China relations remains 
largely unshifted strategically.  
On the other hand, Philippine foreign policy towards China has shifted 
towards a less cooperative, if not anti-China direction both rhetorically and 
strategically after Aquino III succeeded to the presidency in 2010. By 
comparing China twice with the pre-WWII Nazi Germany, Aquino III was 
signalling to China and other countries that the Philippines has always been 
suspicious towards China and regards China’s rise as a threat to the region. 
Aquino’s contestation did not stop at the rhetoric level, Philippine-China 
relation has been reoriented into a completely different direction which is 
largely driven by the state-led nationalist agenda.  Though China is the 160
Philippines’ third largest trading partner, Aquino played down the importance 
of Chinese investments, he pointed out that “Filipinos have invested $3 billion 
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in China, while the Chinese have only invested $1.5 billion in return.”  161
Philippine under Aquino’s government, unlike Hanoi, did not regard a closer 
economic ties with  China essential to the country’s economic survival and 
development.  
The second difference is closely related to the first one, that countries 
which experience legitimacy crises, and the source of crises come from the 
domestic domain, are more likely to generate drastic foreign policy shifts. In 
the Philippines, leadership transitions caused by major legitimacy crises, 
namely from Marcos to Corazon Aquino, and from Gloria Arroyo to Aquino 
III, were often accompanied by the delegitimization of the previous 
government. Aquino III and his cabinet demarcated themselves from Arroyo’s 
political supporters and discredited her political resources which including 
Chinese investments which were deemed as the ‘source of corruption’ that had 
aided Arroyo and her greedy patrons. As noted by Chan and Li, “[Aquino’s] 
anti-corruption crusade against the former regime and its links to corruption-
tainted Chinese investment deals and loans may have influenced his distrustful 
attitude toward China.”  Instead of seeking foreign direct investment from 162
China, Aquino turned to the US and Japan for economic and security support.  
Unlike the Philippines, which has a security treaty with Washington, 
Vietnam has sought to develop stronger relations with several powers.  Party 163
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split between the pro-Beijing group and the pro-US group forbade the 
country’s foreign policy from completely sliding into one direction and getting 
too close with any of the great powers. Hanoi’s approach therefore, occupies 
the middle-ground in managing its relations with great powers. For instance, 
Hanoi today continued to seek benefits from both China and the US. In 2015, 
bilateral relations with China has entered into a difficult phrase as the Chinese 
oil rig was returned to the disputed waters. Vietnam, however, retained a 
strong trading relationship with China. At the same time, Vietnam began to 
seek strategic partnership with the US in order to counter-balance a potential 
China threat in 2015.   164
However, due to party factionalism, the Vietnamese government has 
frequently debated to “what degree it should align itself with US strategic 
interests in the Asia-Pacific given the country’s economic situation today.”  165
Thus, legitimacy crises in Vietnam did not trigger a complete shift of its 
foreign policy orientation as the political party is divided but an agreement has 
to be reached between different factions due to collective leadership when 
comes to decision-making. In the case of Malaysia, the lack of a viable 
political opposition to the ruling party and little internal division within 
UMNO, foreign policy towards China remains much more consistent and 
bilateral relations remains largely stable. 
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The most important difference that deserves a closer attention is perhaps, 
the divergence of narratives that have been constructed by different countries. 
Previous works examine the rise of China focus on only two possible 
outcomes or features by asking whether a rising China is threatening or non-
threatening. My findings, however, demonstrate that the rise of China has 
more nuanced meanings other than threatening versus non-threatening, and 
they are subject to changes.  
In Southeast Asia, the rise of China presents a spectrum of meanings and 
significance. Each narrative reflects the perception of a rising China from an 
unique perspective that may not be generalizable to other cases. For instance, 
one interesting narrative emerged from the Vietnamese discourse identifies a 
rising China as a key competitor in Southeast Asia. According to the 
illustrations in the source, that “Vietnam and China [are] increasingly 
competing for influence in mainland Southeast Asia, where Vietnam had 
dominated between the 1970s and late 2000s. China has become the largest aid 
donor, investor…[and] military partner to Myanmar, Cambodia, Thailand, and 
Laos… [There is a] race for regional influence [between China and 
Vietnam].”  This shows that a non-hegemonic power such as Vietnam 166
perceives a rising China as a potential threat, but not for the exact same 
reasons which previous studies have forecasted. It is not the erosion of the 
neoliberal hegemony engendered by China’s rise that Vietnam is worrying for, 
 Joshua Kurlantizick A China-Vietnam Military Clash, Contingency planning memorandum 166
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as many institutionalist scholars have argued, but the loss of regional 
dominance and influence to China. 
The notion of China’s rise is to be examined within a specific context in 
order to appreciate the richness of this concept. All three countries identify a 
rising China as economic powerhouse; only Malaysia accepted that China’s 
economic development would bringing desirable outcomes without posing 
much doubt, Vietnam and the Philippines under Arroyo believed that China’s 
rise brought both opportunities and challenges to the region. Thus, instead of 
focusing exclusively on the two extreme ends of the spectrum (threatening or 
non-threatening), it would be more useful to also look at more specifically the 
spectrum by itself and the reasons behind each position that was taken. This 
way will help us better analyze the process of each hegemonic transition.  
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Chapter 6  Conclusion 
This study examines the rise of China from the perspective of smaller regional 
powers in Southeast Asia. The primary aim is to get a more systematic 
understanding of individual actors’ perception of China’s rise because the 
importance of perception is underrepresented in the existing literature on the 
study of China’s rise as well as hegemonic power transition. My analysis 
highlights the constructive nature of certain aspects of China’s rise through the 
eyes of regional actors, that perception of the rise of China can be understood 
as a constructed narrative. The portrayal of China’s rise to regional hegemony 
is partly informed by political agenda at home. Changes of perception which 
would also lead to the construction of inconsistent narratives are mostly 
observed in times of political legitimacy crises. 
The constructed narrative framework which I offer in this study helps to 
uncover certain features of China’s rise that are otherwise unattainable. First, 
China’s rise is not a static concept, and one should not see only two possible 
trajectories of China’s rise between peaceful rise and aggressive 
preponderance. Instead, China’s rise has been portrayed as an multilayered 
image that reflects regional actors’ mixed feelings towards China.  
A conventional explanation for regional perception and response follows 
such a logic: on the one hand, China’s economic ascendance has been regarded 
as presenting opportunities for regional development and security. On the 
other hand, the increased Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea created 
anxieties and animosities that some regional actors began to associate China 
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with having expansionist ambition. However, my analysis for Vietnam, the 
Philippines, and Malaysia shows that there are other possibilities out there. 
Perceived Chinese aggressiveness, only affects certain countries at certain 
levels. Vietnam crafts China as an assertive power having expansionist intent 
in its rhetoric, but maintains a close diplomatic and party-to-party ties with 
Beijing. In the Philippines there saw a drastic shift in its foreign policy 
towards China after Aquino came to power. Aquino’s government criticized 
China for both causing tensions in the region and for misusing its economic 
power. Thus, China’s new approach in the South China Sea has only adversely 
affected its strategic relations with Vietnam; but with the Philippines, both 
economic relations as well as strategic relations were severally affected. 
Neither Vietnam nor the Philippines are completely buying into the idea that 
China is exerting hegemonic preponderance that is undesirable. The 
Philippines under Arroyo certainly did not identify China as such; Vietnam’s 
responses have followed contradictory trends.  
Second, narratives of the rise of China are inconsistent and are subject to 
changes. Existing scholarship on domestic politics and its effects on foreign 
policy focuses largely on regime changes. Upon a closer examination of a 
country’s domestic politics, this study urges scholars to pay more attention to 
other important factors in the domestic domain such as party factionalism and 
leadership changes. Although Malaysia and the Philippines adhere to a 
democratic political system, over the past twenty years Malaysia’s domestic 
politics is much more stable and predicable vis-a-vis its foreign policy. 
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Vietnam despite being a single party authoritarian state, party factionalism 
defines its rather unique approach in dealing with great powers in the region. 
As I have demonstrated in the section on historical analysis, my ‘constructed 
narrative’ argument is generalizable and is able to explain not only the 
phenomenon of China’s rise, but also regional actors’ relations with other 
major powers in the past. 
My work claims to make two contributions to the existing scholarship on 
international politics. First, the analysis for Southeast Asia’s response to a 
rising China both illustrates the dynamics as well as explains the critical 
junctures in the process of hegemonic transition. The balancing and 
bandwagoning literature focuses on describing the features of the post-
unipolar international order or predict the possible outcomes.  
Most of these works, however, fail to explain adequately how non-
hegemonic states in Asia are perceiving and to responding to the rise of China. 
The power transition theory which is the camp most scholars who study the 
rise of China ground themselves, does not pay attention to the process of 
power transition; they are unable to capture important factors that would 
define and shape the contour of a hegemonic power shift. Policy studies on 
Southeast Asia’s response to China’s rise attempted to evoke the importance of 
perception in a county’s foreign policy making process, but these works 
generally lack a systematic theorization of the role of perception in 
international politics. Existing literature is neither effective nor sufficient in 
explaining the divergence of regional responses to the rise of China in Asia. 
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My approach complements these works and argues that to obtain a holistic 
understanding of the rise of China and its implications in the region, it is 
necessary to dissect the domestic politics of individual regional actors.  
My work is socially relevant as it generates insights for policy-making. 
China identifies Southeast Asia as an integral part of its security community, 
and values regional organizations such as ASEAN for the role it may play in 
the realization of China’s desire to a sustained economic development. In 
order to achieve its primary objective in the region, Beijing needs to know its 
neighbors better. Among the many important things China’s policy-makers are 
required to learn, the political environment that is rather unique to specific 
Southeast Asian countries deserves Beijing’s attention.  
To illustrate, the dynamics of domestic politics are different in ways that are 
critical to the country’s foreign policy. In the Philippines, leadership changes 
are the critical junctures of foreign policy shifts; in Vietnam, party 
factionalism plays a big role in defining the direction of its foreign policy 
orientation; and in Malaysia, the longevity of the UMNO coalition as the 
legitimate ruling party to a large extent contributed to a consistent and stable 
foreign relations with China. As a result perhaps, speaking from a strategic 
point of view, Beijing should have adopted different approaches to dealing 
with different countries. Taking the case of the Philippines as an example, 
China could have reduced the economic losses due to the cancellation of the 
ZTE and the North Rail project should China took into account the potential 
risk of Philippine’s leadership changes. Today, a foreign policy shift is likely 
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to happen again in the Philippines after Rodrigo Duterte became the newly 
elected president in May 2016 as Duterte announced his preference in 
engaging China with bilateral South China Sea talks, which is distinctively 
different from his predecessor. Given what has been observed over the last two 
leadership transitions, it is very likely that the narrative of China’s rise would 
be reconstructed under Duterte’s government. 
Lastly, based on my analysis for the rise of China, I offer a new of 
framework to conceptualizing the rise and fall of hegemonic powers. I will 
explore and develop the importance of ‘time’ in my next project. I point out 
that the establishment of regional hegemony takes a long time to materialize 
and will be constantly confronted by non-hegemonic powers.  
In this regard, China has experienced impressive economic growth over the 
past twenty to thirty years, and began to be recognized as a rising hegemon 
only for a decade. Speaking horizontally from the dimension of time, twenty 
years is too short for the image of a mature great power to be fully 
constructed. Similarly, the US has failed to establish itself as an American 
Hegemon as Cuba, Venezuela and other states have consistently challenged its 
hegemony in the western hemisphere. Counter-hegemonic regionalism has 
been attempted in America, and it is happening in Asia today. This explains 
why the narrative of the ‘rise of China’ changes rather frequently, that some 
Southeast Asian states’ attitudes towards China swings forward or backward 
like a pendulum, while some remain strategically ambivalent to avoid side-
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lining. In sum, the image of a regional hegemon takes time to characterize, and 
China has not yet reached to a great power status comparable to that of the US.  
 105
Bibliography  
Aileen Baviera, “The Influence of Domestic Politics on Philippine Foreign 
Policy: The Case of Philippines-China Relations Since 2004”, RSIS 
Working Paper 241 (5 June 2012), available at <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/
wp-content/uploads/rsis-pubs/WP241.pdf> 
Alagappa, M., Case, W. F., & Khong, C. O. (1995). Political legitimacy in 
southeast asia: The quest for moral authority. Stanford, Calif: Stanford 
University Press, pp.138-156. 
Alexander L. Vuving “Vietnam, Arriving in the World—and at a crossroads” 
in Singh, D., & Tin Maung Maung Than. (2008). Southeast asian affairs 
2008. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.  
Amin Mokhtar, “Malaysia believes South China Sea dispute can be resolved 
peacefully.” 13 July 2016, New Straits Times <http:// www.nst.com.my/
news/2016/07/157950/malaysia-believes-south-china-sea-dispute-can-
be- resolved-peacefully>  
Amitav Acharya “Containment, engagement, or counter-dominance? 
Malaysia’s response to the rise of China” in Johnston, A. I., & Ross, R. 
S. (1999). Engaging china: The management of an emerging power. 
New York;London;: Routledge. 
Anderson, B. (1988). Cacique democracy and the philippines: Origins and 
dreams. New Left Review, (169), 3. 
Atsumi Okabe, “Coping with China” in Morley, J. W., Nishihara, M., & 
NetLibrary, I. (1997). Vietnam joins the world. Armonk, N.Y: M.E. 
Sharpe. 
Baker, Anni. (2004) American Soldiers Overseas. Westport, CT: Praeger 
Publishers, 115-116. 
Bello, W. (1986). Aquino's elite populism: Initial reflections. Third World 
Quarterly, 8(3), 1020-1030. 
Buzan, B. (2010). China in international society: Is 'peaceful rise' possible? 
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3(1), pp.5. 
Canh, N. V., & Cooper, E. (1983). Vietnam under communism, 1975-1982. 
Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution Press, pp.70. 
Carl Thayer, “8 Developments in US-Vietnam Relations Show Emerging 




CHENG-CHWEE, K. (2008). The essence of hedging: Malaysia and 
singapore's response to a rising china. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 
30(2), 159-185. 
Chong, Ja Ian. (2003) “Revisiting responses to power preponderance: going 
beyond the balancing-bandwagoning dichotomy,” Institute of Defence 
and Strategic Studies Singapore 
Crockatt, R. (1995). The fifty years war: The united states and the soviet union 
in world politics, 1941-1991. New York;London;: Routledge, pp.245. 
Croissant, A., & Martín, B. (2006). Between consolidation and crisis: 
Elections and democracy in five nations in southeast asia. 
London;Münster;: Lit, pp. 32-33 & 203. 
Crouch, H. A. (1996). Government and society in malaysia. Ithaca, N.Y: 
Cornell University Press, pp.246. 
David Han “Why Malaysia’s South China Sea policy seems confused”, The 
Straits Times, May 5 2016, <http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/why-
malaysias-south-china-sea-policy- seems-confused > 
David, S. R. (1991). Choosing sides: Alignment and realignment in the third 
world. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp.236. 
David Wurfel “Philippine Foreign Policy” in Wurfel, D., Burton, B., Stubbs, 
R., & Lim, L. (1990). The political economy of foreign policy in 
southeast asia. Basingstoke, Hants: Macmillan. 
Denny Roy, ‘Hegemon on the Horizon? China’s Threat to East Asian 
Security’, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1994, pp. 149–68. 
Donald S. Zagoria, “Joining ASEAN” in Morley, J. W., Nishihara, M., & 
NetLibrary, I. (1997). Vietnam joins the world. Armonk, N.Y: M.E. 
Sharpe. 
Elizabeth Ruth Deyro “In Numbers: Philippines-China relations” <http://
www.rappler.com/ newsbreak/iq/95744-in-numbers-philippines-china-
relations> 
Elman, M. F. (1995). The foreign policies of small states: Challenging 
neorealism in its own backyard. British Journal of Political Science, 
25(2), 175. 
 107
Ely Ratner “China and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia: Security 
Dynamics in Southeast Asia and Oceania and Implications for the 
United States”. March 13, 2014. Testimony before the US-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission. <http://www.uscc.gov/
sites/default/files/Ratner_Testimony.pdf>  
Ernest Z. Bower “Philippine Elections: Aquino to become 15th president of 
the republic of the Philippines” 11 May 2010, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies <https:// www.csis.org/analysis/philippine-
elections-aquino-become-15th-president-republic-philippines> 
Evelyn Goh, “Southeast Asian responses to China’s rise, Managing the 
“elephants”?” in Cooney, K. J., Sato, Y., & NetLibrary, I. (2009). The 
rise of china and international security: America and asia respond. New 
York, NY: Routledge. 
Friedberg, A. L. (2005). The future of U.S.-china relations: Is conflict 
inevitable? International Security, 30(2), 7-45.  
Gerring, J. (2004). What is a case study and what is it good for? American 
Political Science Review, 98(2), 341-354. 
Gilpin, R. (1981). War and change in world politics. Cambridge; New York;: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Goh, E. (2007;2008;). Great powers and hierarchical order in southeast asia: 
Analyzing regional security strategies. International Security, 32(3), pp.
113-157. 
Goh, E., & East-West Center Washington. (2005). Meeting the china 
challenge: The U.S. in southeast asian regional security strategies. 
Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington. 
Gries, P. H. (2005). China eyes the hegemon. Orbis, 49(3), 401-412. 
He, K., & NetLibrary, I. (2009). Institutional balancing in the asia pacific: 
Economic interdependence and china's rise. Abingdon, Oxon;New York, 
NY;: Routledge, pp.73. 
Hershberg, James G. (James Gordon), Chen, J., & Cold War International 
History Project. (1996). The cold war in asia, pp.240-241. 
HIEP, L. H. (2012). Performance-based legitimacy: The case of the communist 
party of vietnam and "doi moi". Contemporary Southeast Asia, 34(2), 
145-172. 
Huiyun, F. (2009). Is china a revisionist power? Chinese Journal of 
International Politics, 2(3), 313-334. 
 108
Hutchcroft, P. D. (2001). Centralization and decentralization in administration 
and politics: Assessing territorial dimensions of authority and power. 
Governance, 14(1), 23-53. 
Ian Storey, “Conflict in the South China Sea: China’s Relations with Vietnam 
and the Philippines”, presented on May 22 2008, at the symposium on 
Crises in the Asia-Pacific at Sophia University, Tokyo. 
Iain Johnston in “Is China a Status Quo Power?” , International Security, vol. 
27, no. 4, pp. 5-56.  
Ikenberry, G. J. (2014). Power, order, and change in world politics. 
Cambridge;New York;: Cambridge University Press. 
Ikenberry, G. J. (2008). The rise of china and the future of the west: Can the 
liberal system survive?. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 
Irene Chan and Li Mingjiang, “Political will and joint development in the 
South China Sea” in Beckman, R. C., LL.M, Wu, S., & Hong, N. (2014). 
Recent developments in the south china sea dispute: The prospect of a 
joint development regime. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. 
J. Andre Sauvageot, “Vietnam, Defence Expenditure and Threat Perception: 
Defending Communist Indochina” in Defence Spending in Southeast 
Asia edited by Chin Kin Wah, pp.291. 
Jack S. Levy, Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China, in China’s 
Ascent edited by Robert Ross and Zhu Feng, pp.11. 
Jian Zhang, ‘China’s Growing Assertiveness in the South China Sea: a 
strategic shift?’, in Buszynski and Roberts, The South China Sea and 
Australia’s Regional Security Environment, pp.19. 
John T. Sidel, “The Philippines The Languages of Legitimation” in Alagappa, 
M., Case, W. F., & Khong, C. O. (1995). Political legitimacy in 
southeast asia: The quest for moral authority. Stanford, Calif: Stanford 
University Press. 
Jonathan London, “South China Sea Crisis Demands Vietnam’s Leadership 
Breakthrough,” Center for Strategic and International Studies CogitAsia 
Blog, May 19, 2014. <http://cogitasia.com/south-china-sea-crisis-
demands-vietnams-leadership-breakthrough/ > 
Jonathan Pollack,“The Transformation of the Asian Security Order: Assessing 
China’s Impact” in Power Shift, edited by David Shambaugh. 
 109
Joshua Kurlantizick A China-Vietnam Military Clash, Contingency planning 
memorandum No. 26 September 2015< http://www.cfr.org/china/china-
vietnam-military-clash/p37029 > 
Kang, D. C. (2003). Getting asia wrong: The need for new analytical 
frameworks. International Security, 27(4), pp.58. 
Kang, D. C. (2002). Crony capitalism: Corruption and development in south 
korea and the philippines. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Kahin, G. M. (1993). The US-philippine security relationship: Dependent on 
the bases? South East Asia Research, 1(2), 127-142. 
Kassimeris, C. (2009). The foreign policy of small powers. International 
Politics, 46(1), 86. 
Katzenstein, P. J., & Keohane, R. O. (2007). Anti-americanisms in world 
politics. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, pp.262. 
Khoo, N. (2010). Breaking the ring of encirclement: The sino-soviet rift and 
chinese policy toward vietnam, 1964-1968. Journal of Cold War Studies, 
12(1), 3-42. 
Kuik, C. (2013). Making sense of Malaysia’s china policy: Asymmetry, 
proximity, and elite's domestic authority. Chinese Journal of 
International Politics, 6(4), 429-467. 
Kuick, Cheng-Chwee. “The China Factor in the US’ ‘Re-Engagement’ with 
Southeast Asia: Drivers and Limits of Converged Hedging.” Asian 
Politics & Policy, 3 (2012): 315–344. 
Lam, P. E., Qin, Y., & Yang, M. (2013). China and east asia: After the wall 
street crisis. Singapore;New Jersey;: World Scientific, pp. 227. 
Lanteigne, M. (2016). Chinese foreign policy: An introduction (Third ed.). 
New York, NY: Routledge. 109-126  
Levy, Jack S. (1999). “Economic Competition, Domestic Politics, and System 
Change: The Rise and Decline of the Anglo-Dutch Rivalry, 1609-1688.” 
In Great Power Rivalries, ed. William R. Thompson. Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press. 
Li Danhui, “ The Sino-Soviet Dispute over Assistance for Vietnam’s Anti-
American War, 1965- 1972” in Behind the bamboo curtain: China, 
Vietnam, and the world beyond Asia edited by Priscilla Roberts, pp.301. 
Li, Mingjiang (2010), “Reconciling Assertiveness and Cooperation? China’s 
Changing Approach to the South China Sea Dispute, Security 
Challenges, Vol. 6, No. 2, Winter, pp. 49-68. 
 110
Mark E. Manyin June 24 2014 US-Vietnam relations in 2014: Current issues 
and implications for US policy. Congressional Research Service <https://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ R40208.pdf > 
Mark Fineman, “US-Philippine Relations Turning Warmer in Post-Marcos 
Era” July 12, 1986. <http://articles.latimes.com/1986-07-12/news/
mn-22628_1_philippine-relations/2> 
Mark Manyin, “US- Vietnam Relations in 2011: Current Issues and 
Implications for US Policy”, Congressional Research Service, 18 May 
2012. 
Mark Thompson’s “Philippine People Power Thirty Years” in Kane, J., Loy, 
H., & Patapan, H. (2011). Political legitimacy in asia: New leadership 
challenges (1st ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. New York: 
Norton, pp.163. 
Medeiros, E., Crane K., Heginbotham E., Lvin N., Lowell J., Rabasa A., 
Seong S. (2008). Pacific Currents: The Responses of US Allies and 
Security Partners in East Asia to China's Rise (RAND Corporation), 
available at <http: / /www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/ 
RAND_MG736.sum.pdf> 
Michael Mastanduno and William C. Wohlforth. “Introduction: Unipolarity, 
State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences.” World Politics, 1 (2009): 
1–27 
Morton Halperin, Priscilla Clapp, and Arnold Kanter’s Bureaucratic Politics 
and Foreign Policy (2006) 
Murray Hiebert, “China’s relations with Burma, Malaysia, and Vietnam” 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) May 13, 2015 
Muthiah Alagappa, “Seeking a more durable basis of authority” in Alagappa, 
M., Case, W. F., & Khong, C. O. (1995). Political legitimacy in 
southeast asia: The quest for moral authority. Stanford, Calif: Stanford 
University Press. 
Mynardo Macaraig, ‘Millions miss out under Arroyo’s watch, analysts say,’ 
Agence France Presse, 26 June 2010. 
Organski, A. F. K. (1968). World politics (2d [rev.] ed.). New York: Knopf. 
Parameswaran, P. (2015). Playing it safe: Malaysia's approach to the south 
china sea and implications for the united states. Center for a New 
American Security. 
 111
Paterno Esmaquel II “Why China prefers Arroyo over Aquino”. <http://
www.rappler.com/nation/ 9128-how-china-views-aquino,-arroyo> 
(Accessed June 6 2016). 
Patricio N Abinales “Aquino’s mixed presidential legacy” East Asia Forum, 
December 30 2015 <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/12/30/aquinos-
mixed-presidential-legacy/> 
Paul, T. V., Larson, D. W., & Wohlforth, W. C. (2014). Status in world politics. 
New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Percival, B., & Net Library, I. (2007). The dragon looks south: China and 
southeast asia in the new century. Westport, Conn: Praeger Security 
International. 
Prashanth Parameswaran, “Playing it safe: Malaysia’s Approach to the South 
China Sea and Implications for the US”. February 2015, Center for a 
New American Security 
Qin Yaqing, “National Identity, Strategic Culture and Security Interests: Three 
Hypotheses on the Interaction between China and International Society, 
” SIIS Journal 1 (2003). 
Ralph Jennings, “Why Malaysia stays quiet about its claims in the South 
China Sea.” 2 June 2016, Forbes <http://www.forbes.com/sites/
ralphjennings/2016/06/02/why- malaysia-stays-quiet-about-its-claims-
in-the-disputed-south-china-sea/#b2737a61beb9> 
Richard D. Fisher “What Ronald Reagan Should Tell Cory Aquino” 
September 12 1986. (Accessed 17 June 2016) <http://www.heritage.org/
research/reports/1986/09/what-ronald- reagan-should-tell-cory-aquino> 
Richard Javad Heydarian “Will Philippine elections bring about a new China 
policy?” February 23 2016 <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/
2016/02/23/Will-Philippine-elections- bring-about-a-new-China-
policy.aspx> 
Robert Ross, ‘Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: 
Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia’, Security Studies, Vol. 15, 
No. 3, 2006, pp. 355–95. 
Ross, Robert. (2007) “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: 
Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia,” in William W. Keller and 
Thomas G. Rawski eds., China’s Rise and the Balance of Influence in 
Asia, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 121-145. 
ROY, D. (2005). Southeast asia and china: Balancing or bandwagoning? 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 27(2), 305-322. 
 112
Russett, B. M., & Oneal, J. R. (2001). Triangulating peace: Democracy, 
interdependence, and international organizations. New York: Norton.  
San Juan, E. (1998). Beyond postcolonial theory (1st ed.). Hampshire: 
Macmillan Press Ltd, pp.65. 
Schreiber, Anna P. (1973), Economic Coercion as an Instrument of Foreign 
Policy: U.S. Economic Measures Against Cuba and the Dominican 
Republic, World Politics, 25, 3, 387–413.  
Schweller, R.L. (2006) Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the 
Balance of Power. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Schweller, R. L., & Pu, X. (2011). After unipolarity: China's visions of 
international order in an era of U.S. decline. International Security, 
36(1), 41-72. 
Schweller, R. L. (1994). Bandwagoning for profit: Bringing the revisionist 
state back in. International Security, 19(1), 72-107. 
Shambaugh, D. (2004;2005;). China engages asia: Reshaping the regional 
order. International Security, 29(3), 64-99. 
Shambaugh, D. L., & NetLibrary, I. (2006). Power shift: China and asia's new 
dynamics. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp.13. 
Shannon Van Sant “Vietnam Political Transition May Improve China Ties” 
Voice of America, 27 January 2016. (accessed 2 July 2016) <http://
www.voanews.com/content/vietnam-political- transition-may-improve-
china-ties/3164543.html> 
Shen Zhihua, “Sino-US Reconciliation and China’s Vietnam Policy” in Behind 
the bamboo curtain: China, Vietnam, and the world beyond Asia edited 
by Priscilla Roberts, pp.364. 
Shi Chunlai, “China-Australia Relations: A Chinese View,” <http://
www.aiia.asn.au/news/chunlai.html.> 
Snyder, J. (1991) Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International 
Ambition. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 
Storey, I. (2011). Southeast asia and the rise of china: The search for security. 
Abingdon, Oxon;New York;: Routledge. 
Shahriman Lockman, “Why Malaysia isn’t afraid of China (for now),” The 




Stephen J. Morris, “The Soviet-Chinese-Vietnamese triangle in the 1970s: the 
view from Moscow” in Behind the bamboo curtain: China, Vietnam, and 
the world beyond Asia edited by Priscilla Roberts, pp.263 & 424-425. 
Teddy Pham “A US-Vietnam Alliance? Not So Fast”. The Diplomat, 4 August 
2014. (accessed 2 July 2016) <http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/a-us-
vietnam-alliance-not-so-fast/> 
Thayer, C. A., & S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. (2010). 
Recent developments in the south china sea: Grounds for cautious 
optimism / carlyle A. thayer. Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. 
Thayer, C. A. (2011). Chinese assertiveness in the south china sea and 
southeast asian responses. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 
30(2), 77.  
Thayer, C. A. (2011). China's new wave of aggressive assertiveness in the 
south china sea. International Journal of China Studies, 2(3), 555. 
THAYER, C. A. (2009). Vietnam and the challenge of political civil society. 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 31(1), 1-27.  
THAYER, C. A. (2010). Political legitimacy in vietnam: Challenge and 
response. Politics & Policy, 38(3), 163-165; 423-444. 
Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Posing Problems Without Catching Up: China’s Rise 
and the Challenges for US Security Policy’, International Security, Vol. 
25, No. 4, 2001, pp. 5–40. 
Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise 
of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia’, International Security, Vol. 
31, No. 1, 2006, pp. 81– 126. 
Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of international politics. Reading, Mass: Addison-
Wesley Pub. Co, pp.79-80. 
Ward, A. (2003). China and america: Trouble ahead? Survival, 45(3), 35-56. 
White, S. (1986). Economic performance and communist legitimacy. World 
Politics, 38(3), pp.463. 
Whitney, Christopher and David Shambaugh. “Soft Power in Asia: Results of 
a 2008 Multinational Survey of Public Opinion.” The Chicago Council 
on Global Affairs. 2008. 
William C. Wohlforth, Jonathan Kirshner, and Michael Mastanduno in Power, 
Order, and Change in World Politics.  
 114
William Case. “Malaysia: Aspects and Audiences of Legitimacy” in Alagappa, 
M., Case, W. F., & Khong, C. O. (1995). Political legitimacy in southeast 
asia: The quest for moral authority. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University 
Press, pp.80. 
Womack, B. (2006). China and Vietnam: The politics of asymmetry. 
Cambridge; New York;: Cambridge University Press, pp.2 &7-18. 
Xiaosong, G., & Womack, B. (2000). Border cooperation between china and 
vietnam in the 1990s. Asian Survey, 40(6), 1042-1058.  
Xuetong, Y. (2006). The rise of china and its power status. The Chinese 
Journal of International Politics, 1(1), 5-33.  
Yuen Foong Khong’s Singapore: a time for economic and political 
engagement in Engaging China edited by Alastair Iain Johnston and 
Robert S. Ross (1999). 
Yuen Foong Khong, “Coping with Strategic Uncertainty, The role of 
Institutions and Soft Balancing in Southeast Asia’s Post—Cold War 
Strategy” in Suh, J. J., Katzenstein, P. J., & Carlson, A. (2004). 
Rethinking security in east asia: Identity, power, and efficiency. 
Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. 
Zhao Hong’s “The Maritime Silk Road and China-Southeast Asia Relations” 
ISEAS Perspective, No. 35, 8 July 2015; Shi Chunlai, “China-Australia 
Relations: A Chinese View”, pp.16. 
Zhou Fangyin, “China’s Rise, the Transformation of East Asian Regional 
Structure, and Development Direction of the East Asian Order”, in The 
world in 2020 according to china : Chinese foreign policy elites discuss 




Speech delivered in front of the members of the Japanese parliament in June 
2015 <http://asianjournal.com/news/aquino-slams-china-in-speech-before-
japans-congress/ > 
 “Aquino insisted that China has been violating the 2002 Declaration on 
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea as it persists on reclaiming 
in the disputed waters, stirring tension in the region.” 
 “This reclamation effort seems to go against both the letter of this 
agreement entered into, as well as the spirit of the law. So, perhaps, we 
again… We reiterate, we ask China: Is this a necessary step?” He 
(Aquino) asked. 
“And if stability is a necessary prerequisite to prosperity for all, and if 
prosperity for all our peoples is the be-all and end-all of any 
government, then perhaps they should reexamine all of these efforts and 
see whether or not this is necessary given the increasing tensions that 
are happening because of these activities,”  
Benigno Aquino made the comments during a speech in the Japanese 
parliament during his visit to Tokyo in June 2015. <https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/03/china-nazi-germany-south-china-
sea-philippine-president-benigno-aquino > 
“If there was a vacuum, if the US, which is the superpower, says ‘we are 
not interested’, perhaps there is no brake to ambitions of other 
countries,” he told an audience of business leaders in Tokyo.” 
“I am an amateur student of history and I’m reminded of…how 
Germany was testing the waters and what the response was by various 
other European powers,” “referring to the Nazis’ territorial conquests in 
the months before the outbreak of the second world war. “They tested 
the waters and they were ready to back down if, for instance, in that 
aspect, France said to back down…But unfortunately, up to the 
annexation of the Sudetenland…nobody said stop. If somebody said 
stop to Hitler at that point of time, or to Germany at that time, 
would we have avoided WWII.”  
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Renato Cruz De Castro, “The Philippines in 2011: Muddling through a Year of 
Learning and Adjustment”, Asian Survey, vol. 52, no. 1 (January-February 
2012 
“Tensions between the Philippines and China over the South China Sea 
have steadily increased since President Benigno Aquino III took office 
in 2010.” 
Stirring Up the SCS (II): Regional Responses, Asia Report No. 229, 24 July 
2012 International Crisis Group <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/
asia/north-east-asia/229-stirring-up-the-south-china-sea-ii-regional-responses>  
“The previous administration of Gloria Arroyo had been considerably 
more receptive to Beijing’s commercial incentives and was apparently 
willing to compromise Philippine claims in response.” (“The former 
government could be bought; the current government cannot. The 
Chinese are likely playing a waiting game, hoping that the government 
will eventually be out of power and a new government will enable them 
to return to their tried and true tactics”. 
“President Aquino also sought to undo the damage caused by his 
predecessor’s accession to the failed JMSU, which he believes 
encouraged greater Chinese forcefulness.” 
“Philippine officials since characterised the agreement as a confidence-
building measure gone awry and argued that it only attests to how China 
takes advantage of such opportunities to behave in a more assertive 
way.” 
“In May 2012, Foreign Secretary Del Rosario called on business leaders 
to “take a position of patriotism that what is ours is ours and we will 
stand for it. It is possible that everyone will need to make a sacrifice.” 
(“DFA chief calls for patriotism”, The Philippine Star, 17 May 2012) He 
played down the value of Chinese investments, though China is the 
Philippines’ third largest trading partner. (He pointed out that Filipinos 
have invested $3 billion in China, while the Chinese have only invested 
$1.5 billion in return. Remarks of Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert F. Del 
Rosario on Philippine Foreign Affairs at the Joint Membership Meeting 
of the Makati Business Club and the Management Association of the 
Philippines, 16 May 2012.) 
President Gloria Arroyo’s Speech During the Opening Ceremony of the 40th 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Manila, 30 July 2007 
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“The rise of China and of India as major economic powers provides us 
with fresh competition as well as cooperation” 
“The rise of China—as the most populated country in the world—as 
global economic powerhouse has opened a lot of opportunities and 
challenges for all the countries in the region.  
[President Arroyo described China as the] "fastest-growing country in 
the region and in the world and the Philippines sees China's rise as a 
significant opportunity for the Philippines," 
Arroyo’s ‘stops’ deal with ZTE; China prexy accepts decision, October 2, 
2007 <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/62860/news/nation/arroyo-
stops-deal-with-zte-china-prexy-accepts-decision> 
"At this point, the President reiterated the strict adherence of the 
Philippines to the One-China Policy and this was very much 
appreciated by President Hu," he said.” 
In a speech on June 08, 2002, before the Filipino Chinese-Chamber of 
Commerce, Mrs Arroyo had recalled: 
  
“I am also very proud that as founding member, lifetime member and co-
chairman of the Association for Philippines-China understanding or 
APCU, I was one of those – along with the in-laws of Congressman 
Ocampo, Roxy Lim and her husband, and Manny Dy – I was one of 
those who worked for the establishment of this diplomatic relations 
between our two countries." 
Mrs Arroyo added: “Together with many of you, my colleagues in 
APCU, we started working for closer Philippines-China relations during 
the early 70s, even before the establishment of formal relations between 
our two countries in June 1975." 
APCU is one of only four organizations Mrs Arroyo acknowledges 
membership in.  
Lanteigne, M. (2016). Chinese foreign policy: An introduction (Third ed.). 
New York, NY: Routledge. 109-126 
“Aquino III was highly critical of Chinese actions in the South China 
Sea. In September 2012, he issued an administrative order which 
renamed the waters the “West Philippine Sea”, and twice the Philippine 
President compared Chinese actions in the region to the expansionist 
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policies of Nazi Germany in the period before the Second World War, 
drawing criticism and concern from Beijing. In June 2015, personnel 
with the Philippine military accompanied Japan’s Self-Defence forces in 
a joint operation near Reed Bank, a region thought to be potentially rich 
in fossil fuels, and another area claimed by Beijing and Manila.”  
“Unlike the Philippines, which has a security treaty with Washington, 
Vietnam has sought to develop stronger relations with several powers, 
including India and Russia as well as the US, to balance against China. 
The decision by China to place an oil rig in disputed waters near the 
Paracel Islands in mid-2014 marked a low point in the bilateral 
relationship, and Hanoi has also been wary of efforts since that time by 
China to engage in land reclamation of reefs which Vietnam has 
claimed. By mid-2015, bilateral relations appeared ready to enter 
another difficult patch as the Chinese oil rig was returned to another 
disputed part of the SCS in an area where the EEZs of Vietnam and 
China overlap. However, the trading relationship between the two 
countries remains strong, and the Vietnamese government has 
frequently debated to what degree it should align itself with US strategic 
interests in the Asia-Pacific given the country’s economic situation 
today.”   
Vietnam  
“Background note: Vietnam”, Department of State, 5 January 2012; Mark 
Manyin, “US-Vietnam Relations in 2011: Current Issues and Implications for 
US Policy”, Congressional Research Service, 18 May 2012. 
“Despite a history of conflict, Vietnam has balanced its opposition to 
China’s territorial claims with its need to maintain substantial 
economic relations with its neighbour. While it is rapidly developing 
economic ties with other countries including the US.”  
“Nationalist sentiments in Vietnam are rooted in historical grievances 
and are inflamed by political personalities and the influential pro-U.S. 
diaspora…As a Vietnamese foreign ministry official states, “the two 
countries are old friends and old enemies, therefore the government has 
to avoid being perceived as selling out national interests to China.” 
(While relations are not always smooth, cooperation at the party-to-
party level has remained substantive. There is an agreement that 
management of the South China Sea issues should be kept within the 
region, but “at the same time we [Vietnam] are ready to defend out 
interests in the South China Sea”. Crisis Group interviews, Hanoi, May 
2011; Beijing, June, 2012.) (Many Vietnamese believe that the 
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) cannot be trusted in its opaque 
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discussions with the Communist Party of China for fear that it will sell 
out Vietnamese interests. Crisis Group interviews, Ho Chi Minh City, 
July 2011; Hanoi, May 2011.) 
“For the Vietnamese leadership, like its Chinese counterpart, 
nationalism is a double-edged sword, working to its advantage while 
also limiting its options.” 
“For 1,000 years we spilled blood to keep our country intact. The East 
Sea disputes strike at the heart of what it means to be Vietnamese”. 
Territorial disputes, coupled with a history of violent conflict and a 
staggering bilateral trade deficit, have fostered widespread suspicion of 
and animosity toward China. This has increased in line with perceptions 
of China’s greater forcefulness since 2009. Political and military 
personalities have accused Hanoi of failing to stand up to China over the 
South China Sea, and the powerful pro-US Vietnamese diaspora has 
used this to criticize the government. As economic problems erode its 
credibility, the Vietnamese leadership cannot afford mismanagement, 
especially given rampant corruption. Nor can it afford being soft on 
China by appearing like it is once again giving up Vietnamese territory. 
(Crisis Group interview, Hanoi, July 2011…On 10 July 2011, twenty 
prominent “patriotic personalities” including former ambassador to 
China, Major General…..submitted a petition to Vietnam’s Politburo and 
National Assembly chairman, claiming that Hanoi had been “too soft” 
with China. “Petition Letter to the Vietnamese Government on the East 
Sea Issue” 
“The government broke up the protests and stated to silence public 
debate on the SCS. Those who continued to demonstrate on the street or 
online were arrested. The crackdown was also motivated by Hanoi’s 
desire not to further damage relations with Beijing. (Crisis Group 
interview)   
Vietnam-China Trade, FDI and ODA Relations (1998-2008) and the Impacts 
upon Vietnam by Ha Thi Hong Van and Do Tien Sam <http://www.ide.go.jp/
English/Publish/Download/Brc/pdf/01_vietnamandchina.pdf> 
In recent years, trade cooperation between Quang Ninh province and 
China has been good, especially with respect to the agricultural sector. 
Many opportunities have been created for the peasants and the Quang 
Ninh agricultural sector to adopt new technology and business systems. 
For example, we now have a lot of new varieties of rice seed, new 
breeds of livestock and new seafood products. In the past, Quang Ninh 
province imported raw materials. But now, with the use of new 
technology which resulted in the production of high-quality seafood 
products, importation of raw materials is not necessary. The resulting 
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surplus generated from the technological improvements brought by trade 
relations between Vietnam and China contributed to poverty reduction. 
Such piece of evidence is supported by a representative of Lao Cai 
province, who claims that new seed varieties imported from China are a 
“revolution”: 
Rapid poverty reduction is dependent on achieving two goals. The first 
goal is attaining ‘seed revolution.’ Before the introduction of new seed 
varieties from China, people planted milpa and water field-based crops 
using intensive cultivation methods and poor-yielding seeds. This ‘seed 
revolution’ came from China, not England. The second goal is linked to 
Lao Cai province. Lao Cai has a relationship with Sichuan province in 
China. Sichuan is the centre for the development of new rice seed 
varieties. And this is where we purchase our rice seed from. (An 
interview with a Lao Cai representative)  
Lam, P. E., Qin, Y., & Yang, M. (2013). China and east asia: After the wall 
street crisis. Singapore;New Jersey;: World Scientific. pp.227-238 
“Although Vietnam’s foreign trade suffered heavily at the outset of the 
Financial Crisis, Vietnam-China trade relations further developed. In 
2013, China surpassed Japan to become Vietnam’s largest trading 
partner.  
“The US, EU and Japan are still mired in economic difficulties. 
Therefore, the present global economy is neither stable nor predictable 
and may well impact on the Chinese and Vietnamese economies 
reliant on foreign trade.  
“Notwithstanding territorial disputes in the South China Sea, 
Vietnam-China economic relations between 2009 and 2010 have 
indeed been enhanced. Bilateral trade values between two countries 
increased even though Vietnam’s total foreign trade value has decreased 
in 2009. Efforts to strengthen friendship between the two countries have 
played an important role to stimulate economic cooperation.”  
Mark E. Manyin June 24 2014 US-Vietnam relations in 2014: Current issues 
and implications for US policy. Congressional Research Service <https://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40208.pdf > 
“For Vietnam, maintaining stability and friendship with its northern 
neighbor is critical for economic development and security; Hanoi 
usually does not undertake large-scale diplomatic moves without 
first calculating Beijing’s likely reaction. To date, even as it has 
protested the oil rig and China’s cordon around it, Hanoi appears to be 
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trying to avoid taking moves that could provoke Beijing, such as 
increasing its naval presence in the area, inviting U.S. Navy ships for 
unscheduled port visits, or initiating a legal case against China’s actions 
and/or claims.” 
“A factor influencing leaders in Hanoi is a significant anti-Chinese 
sentiment inside Vietnam. These emotions surfaced in the days after 
CNOOC’s positioning of its oil rig. Protests involving thousands of 
Vietnamese ensued. Reportedly most occurred in urban areas, were 
peaceful, and appeared to be tolerated by Vietnamese authorities, who 
generally prevent large-scale gatherings.  
Jonathan London, “South China Sea Crisis Demands Vietnam’s Leadership 
Breakthrough,” Center for Strategic and International Studies CogitAsia Blog, 
May 19, 2014. <http://cogitasia.com/south-china-sea-crisis-demands-
vietnams-leadership-breakthrough/ > 
“The second grouping gravitates toward a triumvirate of Communist 
Party Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, President Truong Tan Sang, and 
leader of the National Assembly Nguyen Sinh Hung. These are 
Vietnam’s conservatives, or defenders of the status quo. Domestically, 
their loyalty has been largely to each other, the party, and the 
military. Internationally, their loyalty has been to the enduring 
investment in the idea that Beijing is a “good comrade.” 
“In recent years, Sino-Vietnam relations have followed seemingly 
contradictory trends. On the one hand, since Vietnam and China repaired 
relations in the early 1990s, China has become Vietnam’s most 
important bilateral partner and its biggest trading partner. 
Maintaining stability and friendship with its northern neighbor is critical 
for Vietnam’s economic development and security, and Hanoi does not 
undertake large-scale diplomatic moves without first calculating 
Beijing’s likely reaction. Over the past four years, Hanoi and Beijing 
have continued to expand their diplomatic and party-to-party ties and 
appear to be seeking ways to prevent their maritime disputes from 
spilling over into other areas of the relationship.”  
“On the other hand, Vietnam’s historical ambivalence and suspicions of 
China have increased in recent years due to concerns that China’s 
expanding influence in Southeast Asia is having a negative effect on 
Vietnam. These concerns, in turn, have led Vietnamese leaders to take 
steps to lessen their dependence on and vulnerabilities to Chinese 
influence. In 2009 Vietnam signed contracts to purchase billions of 
dollars of new military equipment from Russia…Vietnamese leaders 
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have become increasingly sensitive to rising domestic criticism that 
they are being overly solicitous toward China.”  
Joshua Kurlantizick “A China-Vietnam Military Clash, Contingency planning 
memorandum” No. 26 September 2015 <http://www.cfr.org/china/china-
vietnam-military-clash/p37029 > 
“In addition, Vietnam and China increasingly compete for influence in 
mainland Southeast Asia, where Vietnam had dominated between the 
1970s and late 2000s. China has become the largest aid donor and 
investor in many mainland Southeast Asian nations, as well as an 
important military partner to Myanmar, Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos. 
Rising nationalism in both Vietnam and China fuels this race for 
regional influence and makes it harder for leaders in each country to 
back down from any confrontation, whatever the initial genesis.  
“Over the past five years, China has used visits by senior Chinese 
leaders to mainland Southeast Asian nations to announce large new aid 
packages. These initiatives have clearly worried Hanoi. After then Vice 
President Xi Jinping’s visit to Cambodia in 2010, during which China 
announced $1.2 billion in new aid deliveries to Phnom Penh, Vietnamese 
leaders scrambled to get Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen to publicly 
highlight his bond with Hanoi.  
China’s rise and Vietnam’s choices  (part 1) 14/08/2014  <http://
english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/special-reports/109691/china-s-rise-and-vietnam-s-
choices--part-1-.html > 
“Dr. Nguyen Hung Son: Well, certainly, as China rises, it wants to have a 
better or higher status in the international stage. One of the 
interpretations of China’s dream is that China would like to become a 
global leading superpower. From what we observed from China’s 
pattern of behavior, we could tell that China is heavily obsessed by what 
they see as a threat from the US and they would like to be able to 
counter that threat. And one of China’s dreams is to be able to avoid or 
escape the threat from the US and be on par with the US from what we 
see, that interprets China’s Naval Dream to become a naval power in the 
area. And to be able to become a naval power, China is increasingly 
investing in its naval military assets and increasingly asserting its power 
at sea, asserting its claims both in the East China Sea and the South 
China Sea. China has set its objectives maybe not directly from the top 
leadership but from various groups of interests inside China—that by 
2021, by 100 years’ anniversary of the Chinese communist party, China 
would like to be able to monopolize or fully control the water space with 
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the first chain of islands, from Japan to Okinawa, Taiwan, Philippines 
down to the South China Sea. That is why China is undertaking several 
activities to assert their claims and enhance their presence within these 
borders of waters.  
“Nobody opposes China’s rise, they have might have some concerns 
over how China rises but I do not think there is anyone who is afraid or 
who does not expect China to rise. I think it is a common consensus in 
the region that China is and is going to continue to rise. That is fully 
expected. What is not expected is that in the course of its rise. It is going 
to change the rules of the game altogether or is going to change the 
status quo to the extent that nobody is going to know what the rules of 
the game are, or they unilaterally change the rules or the norms of the 
region that countries in the region are so accustomed to and are so 
supportive. And what is essentially the system of international relations 
created after the WWII.  So, I think, on the one hand, countries welcome 
China’s rise, especially economically rising China, but on the other 
hand, they also have certain expectations of China and China’s rise, 
especially in political and security fields. It is the common wisdom of 
the region that China is going to listen to the expectation of the 
international community and stay within the framework that they think 
is beneficial to China as well.  
As China Rises, So Does Vietnam by Wayne Arnold 21 December 2010, The 
New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/22/business/global/
22chinavietnam.html?_r=0 > 
“One of the biggest beneficiaries of China’s rapid economic ascent is not 
China at all, but rather its historic rival, occasional enemy and fellow 
socialist neighbour to the South, Vietnam…Vietnam has instead 
managed to tag along a fast-growing population of 87 million people, 
cheap labor and a free-trade agreement that has enabled Vietnam to 
become part of the vast global supply chain that feeds China’s 
manufacturing machine.  
Vietnam adds military muscle as SCS tensions escalate by Trefor Moss 21 Feb 
2016, The Wall Street Journal <http://www.wsj.com/articles/vietnam-adds-
military-muscle-as-south-china-sea-tensions-escalate-1456095603 > 
“It is obvious and necessary for Vietnam to invest in new military 
equipment, especially after the South China Sea has become a hot spot,” 
said Tran Cong Truc, former chief of the government’s border committee 
said, stressing that the new hardware isn’t aimed specifically at China.” 
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Storey, I. (2011). Southeast asia and the rise of china: The search for security. 
Abingdon, Oxon;New York;: Routledge. 
“It was an inauspicious start to the new relationship, but the desire to 
avoid military confrontation in the South China Sea helped concentrate 
minds in Hanoi and Beijing, and spurred the two sides into diplomatic 
action. In October 1993 agreement was reached on a framework for 
future discussions. Both sides agreed to resolve their disputes through 
peaceful means and not to use force or the threat of force. Priority 
was given to the land boundary and Gulf of Tonkin issues because they 
were seen as more amenable to a resolution than the South China Sea 
dispute, and because it was in their mutual economic interests to resolve 
these problems…At the close of the 20th century, both sides could take 
comfort from the fact that the normalization process had progressed 
better than expected, and that two of three territorial disputes had been 
resolved at least in principle.   
The structure of Vietnam-China relations, 1991-2008, paper for the 3rd 
international conference on Vietnamese studies, Hanoi, Vietnam December 
4-7, 2008 by Carlyle A. Thayer <http://www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/
Thayer_Sino_Viet_1991_2008.pdf>  
“In 1993 Vietnam and China reached agreement on the basic principles 
to manage their common border and maritime territory. This led to 
agreement on demarcating the land border in 1999 and the Gulf of 
Tonkin in 2000. By 2008 China and Vietnam put in place approximately 
eighty-five percent of the approved border markers. A border 
management treaty is currently under negotiated a protocol on a joint 
fishing area and agreed to joint naval patrols.”  
China’s relations in the Asia-Pacific: Vietnam by Hung Nguyen, The 
Diplomat, The Diplomat, February 15, 2011 http://thediplomat.com/2011/02/
vietnam/  
“The third phrase began in 1991, with the restoration of diplomatic 
relations between the two countries through 2007. The first few years of 
this period saw a rapid improvement in bilateral relations based on 
‘sixteen golden words’—friendly neighbours, total cooperation, 
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stable and long-term, future-oriented increased trade and settlement 
of border disputes, mostly in favour of China.” 
“The fourth phase, which began in 2008, pitched China’s increasing 
assertiveness against Vietnam’s efforts to preserve its sovereignty and 
territorial integrity in the face of the China challenge. The future of 
Vietnam-China relations depends on the interaction between two 
constants (geography and history) and two variables (China’s policy and 
changing big powers’ relationship).”  
Malaysia 
Aileen S.P. Baviera “Accommodation with Hedging: Southeast Asia’s 
Changing Perspective towards China.” in Yee, H. S. (2010). China's rise: 
Threat or opportunity?. New York; Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, [England];: 
Routledge. 
“Malaysia, which like the Philippines is embroiled in maritime disputes 
with China in the South China Sea, was also highly suspicious of 
Chinese intentions especially following the Mischief Reef incident in 
early 1995 wherein China occupied a reef within the Philippines’ 
claimed area of the South China Sea. However, a since a 1997 visit by 
Premier Li Peng to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia appears to have reached 
greater agreement with China on the value of a bilaterally-negotiated 
joint development approach to disputed areas. From then on, Malaysia 
publicly rejected the notion that China posed a threat to its 
neighbors, with the latter even calling China “a force for peace and 
stability” while calling the US-led security and defense alliance in 
the Asia Pacific region “unnecessary” and “destabilizing.” Malaysia 
has also taken similar positions as China on the desirability of building 
an East Asian community inclusive only of ASEAN and the northeast 
Asian states, on the preference for a multipolar world order, and on 
criticism of the US’s foreign policy.  
“Malaysia in late 2005 welcomed China’s role in enhancing the 
security of the Straits of Malacca. Malaysia and Indonesia had also 
signed an agreement with China to help develop long-range missiles 
through technology transfer. These agreements and developments may 
be seen as part of the “accommodation” to China, appearing to respond 
to China’s New Security Concept and good neighbor policy, and because 
they will mean China’s increasing involvement as a responsible 
stakeholder in the security of Southeast Asia.” 
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Shannon Tiezzi, November 18, 2015 “Can China Rebuild Its ‘Special 
Relationship’ with Malaysia?” The Diplomat <http://thediplomat.com/
2015/11/can-china-rebuild-its-special-relationship-with-malaysia/ > 
“Xi assured Najib that China considers boosting relations with Malaysia 
to be a priority in its neighborhood diplomacy, playing into the narrative 
that the two countries have a ‘special relationship.’  
“China and Malaysia are good neighbors and friends that trust and 
respect each other,” Xi told Najib, Xi also pledged increased investment 
in Malaysia, and pointed to the development of the 21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road as an opportunity to advance relations between the 
two sides.” 
“Najib, for his part, told reporters that he and Xi had agreed “the state of 
bilateral relations is at its best based on mutual trust and friendly 
cooperation between the two countries as close partners.”  
“Kuala Lumpur is generally more low-key in its response than other 
claimants, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, choosing instead to raise 
its concerns in private bilateral discussions, which is China’s preferred 
method of dealing with the disputes). Malaysia clearly values its ‘special 
relationship’ with China, which is also its top trading partner, too much 
to risk disrupting ties with vocal opposition on the South China Sea 
issue.”  
Amin Mokhtar, 13 July 2016. “Malaysia believes South China Sea dispute can 
be resolved peacefully” New Straits Times http://www.nst.com.my/news/
2016/07/157950/malaysia-believes-south-china-sea-dispute-can-be-resolved-
peacefully  
“Malaysia is fully committed and calls on all parties to ensure the full 
and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in its entirety; and the early 
conclusion if a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) as 
agreed between China and ASEAN countries.” —the Foreign Ministry 
of Malaysia.”  
Storey, I. (2011). Southeast asia and the rise of china: The search for security. 
Abingdon, Oxon;New York;: Routledge. 
“Post-Mahathir, political relations between Malaysia and China 
remained cordial. Abdullah’s government continued to deny that the rise of 
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China posed a threat to regional security: to the contrary, Najib argued, 
China was a force for stability because it required a peaceful regional 
environment in which to pursue economic development. Far from being 
a threat, opined the Deputy Prime Minister, ASEAN looked to the PRC as 
“an ally to strengthen and enhance its position and voice in regional 
affairs. At the 2007 Davos Forum, Abdullah echoed his predecessor when 
he declared there was ‘no such thing as China threat’ and that ASEAN 
viewed the PRC as an integral part of the organization though its 
participation in the APT. Government officials also maintained their relaxed 
attitude to the modernisation of the PLA. For instance, Foreign Minister 
Syed Hamid Albar told parliament in 2007 that China was ‘merely looking 
after its own interests’ by upgrading its armed forces, and that Beijing had 
no expansionist intent.” 
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